The Dallas Court of Appeals has found that a trial court clearly abused its discretion by denying a defendant in an action on a sworn account his request for a jury trial on the reasonableness of the plaintiff’s attorney’s fees.
William Simons Garland v. Medical Hyperbarics, Inc. (No. 05-23-00053-CV; March 15, 2024) arose from medical expenses defendant Simon incurred when he was treated for the bends at a Cancun hospital. Upon admission defendant signed an obligation to pay agreement naming plaintiff as creditor. When discharged from the hospital a few days later, defendant received a bill for more than $24,000. Defendant paid about a third of the bill and his health insurer another $1400, leaving a balance of about $13,000. When defendant did not respond to a written demand for payment of the balance, plaintiff filed suit, asserting breach of contract, unjust enrichment, and attorney’s fees. Defendant answered and asserted affirmative defenses. Defendant also requested a jury trial and paid the jury fee. Plaintiff moved for traditional and no-evidence summary judgment, which the trial court granted. When plaintiff sought to put on evidence of attorney’s fees, defendant objected and reiterated his demand for a jury trial. The trial court went ahead and heard evidence from plaintiff’s fee expert, deferring the jury trial issue. Several months later, the trial court signed an order granting plaintiff more than $32,000 in attorney’s fees and another $35,000 in conditional appellate fees. Defendant appealed.
In an opinion by Justice Nowell, the court of appeals reversed as to the jury trial issue. The court observed that in this case, a jury trial was available as a matter of right. Consequently, the issue was whether defendant made a timely request that must be granted unless it would “(1) injure the adverse party, (2) disrupt the court’s docket, or (3) impede the ordinary handling of the court’s business.” Since this case involved an action on a sworn account under § 38.001(b), CPRC, fee-shifting was authorized, but even so plaintiff was required to prove the reasonableness of the fees. And because Chapter 38 does not specifically exclude a jury trial on the reasonableness of a party’s fees, there is a presumption in favor of the constitutional right to a jury trial on the question. Here the defendant timely requested a jury trial and paid the fee. He further objected to the trial court hearing the issue without empaneling a jury. Finally, there was no evidence that having a jury trial would cause anybody any harm or disruption to the court. Plaintiff tried to rescue the situation by arguing that its attorney’s fees request was really a motion for summary judgment, so no jury trial was warranted. The court saw right through this ruse, declining “to abrogate Simon’s right to a jury trial under the Texas Constitution by after-the-fact, creative lawyering.”
