The 15th Court of Appeals has affirmed a trial court order granting summary judgment to the City of Dallas and State Fair of Texas in the much ballyhooed (and blatantly political) effort of the Office of Attorney General to block the State Fair’s decision to bar guns in Fair Park.
State of Texas, Maxx Juusola, Tracy Martin, and Alan Crider v. City of Dallas, Kimberly Bizor Tolbert, In Her Official Capacity as the City Manager for the City of Dallas and the State Fair of Texas (No. 15-25-00122-CV; August 6, 2026) arose from the State Fair of Texas’s 2024 adoption of a policy that prohibited patrons from carrying guns onto the fairgrounds. Upon receiving complaints from some people, the OAG initiated an investigation and notified the City that it had violated § 411.209, Government Code. When the City asserted that it hadn’t violated the statute, the State brought this suit, which individual Plaintiffs later joined. Plaintiffs sought a temporary injunction to block the State Fair from enforcing the policy. The trial court denied the State’s request, followed by the 15th Court of Appeals’s denial of the State’s interlocutory appeal and motion for emergency relief. SCOTX then denied the State’s petition for writ of mandamus. Now back in the trial court, the State amended its petition to add a constitutional claim and an ultra vires claim against the city manager. All parties moved for summary judgment. The trial court denied the State’s MSJ, granted the State Fair’s and City’s MSJs, sustained the State Fair’ objections to Plaintiffs’ summary judgment evidence, and dismissed Plaintiffs’ claims with prejudice. Plaintiff’s appealed.
In an opinion by Justice Farris, the court of appeals affirmed. The sole issue before the court was Plaintiffs’ claim that the State Fair and City violated § 411.209. That statute prohibits a state agency or political subdivision from taking an action “that states or implies that a license holder who is carrying a handgun under the authority of this subchapter is prohibited from entering or remaining on a premises or other place owned or leased by a governmental entity ….” Plaintiffs argued that the City failed to stop the State Fair from adopting a firearm ban, thus implying that an authorized license holder couldn’t carry a handgun on premises leased by the City to the State Fair. The City asserted governmental immunity on the basis that it didn’t ban guns, a nonprofit organization, which is not a political subdivision, did. The court agreed, noting that the State failed to produce any evidence raising a fact issue that the City did anything to violate the statute. And since the statute only waives sovereign immunity “to the extent of liability created by this section,” the city had no liability and didn’t waive liability.
The court further upheld the trial court’s exclusion of the City’s response to the OAG that it would cooperate with state law regarding a peace officer’s authority to carry a weapon on Fair Park premises. That letter, and the State Fair’s letter attached to it, had nothing to do with § 411.209’s prohibition on relevant actions by the state or a political subdivision. The OAG tried to argue that the City was liable under the statute because it held a leasehold interest in Fair Park. Looking to the text of the statute, the court determined that it prohibited government conduct; it didn’t place a restriction on government property.And if the Legislature had wanted to do that, it knew how to because a variety of statutes restrict guns on specified premises. Undeterred, the OAG contended that the City “implicitly ratified” the State Fair’s policy. The court turned this one aside as well, finding that the State produced no evidence raising a genuine issue of material fact that the City implicitly ratified anything, much less had a “clear intent” to do so. Perhaps if the lease itself had said something about it, the OAG’s argument might have had a chance. But the lease was silent. Additionally, the State Fair testified that the City had nothing to do with its decision (or any decision) in the first place.
The court thus upheld the trial court order granting Defendants’ MSJs. The State Fair also challenged the individual plaintiffs’ standing to bring their claims, arguing that since they couldn’t bring a claim under § 411.209, they were out of luck. The court, however, stated that the State Fair had confused standing with “capacity.” In any event, since the statute doesn’t authorize either the State or an individual to sue a private entity for a violation, they were out of luck anyway.
