The 15th Court of Appeals has reversed a trial court order denying the state’s plea to the jurisdiction in a lawsuit seeking restitution for the value of property sold at a forced sale to pay a judgment for the state in a public enforcement action under the DTPA. That judgment was subsequently overturned by the Amarillo Court of Appeals.
Appellant, The State of Texas//Cross-Appellants Patrick Cox, For Himself and as Agent for AOC Ranches, LLC; Team Advertising Services, Inc.; CCLHR Enterprises, LLC; and Vpizza Restaurant 001, LLC v. Appellees Patrick Cox, For Himself and as Agent for AOC Ranches, LLC; Team Advertising Services, Inc.; CCLHR Enterprises, LLC; and Vpizza Restaurant 001, LLC//Cross-Appellee, The State of Texas (No. 15-25-00117-CV; June 25, 2026) arose from a 2010 state public enforcement action for DTPA violations against Patrick Cox and two entities he founded. A jury found in favor of the state and assessed restitution and civil penalties against each defendant. The court ordered Cox to pay more than $14.6 million in restitution, $31,250,000 in penalties, and more than $350,000 in attorney’s fees. The trial court granted the state’s application for turnover and appointment of a receiver, who took possession of and sold Cox’s non-exempt property for a total of $830,756. The other two entities, then in bankruptcy, agreed to create a compromise account that yielded an additional $560,207.
In 2014 the Amarillo Court of Appeals reversed the trial court judgment holding Cox personally liable for the DTPA violations. Two years later, Cox filed for bankruptcy and requested that the receiver in the DTPA case file an accounting and return his property. The receiver returned certain personal property and gave up any interest in stocks and ownership interests in several entities. Cox then demanded return of the receiver’s fees and expenses, which the bankruptcy court denied on the basis that judicial immunity barred any recovery from a court-appointed receiver. The two entities likewise held liable for the DPTA violations then filed a proof of claim in Cox’s bankruptcy case for $9 million, which the parties negotiated down to $1 million. The bankruptcy court approved a settlement agreement under which the trustee agreed to transfer $125,000 to Cox’s estate and another $435,206.86 (out of the original $560,207 recovered by the state) for deemed payment to the trustee in satisfaction of the $1 million claim.
Next, Cox sued the state seeking restoration of property allegedly wrongfully taken from Cox. He asserted claims for restitution, arguing that he was entitled to the full value of the property, not just the proceeds of the forced sale. He also asserted civil conversation, due process violations, and taking claims under the Texas and U.S. Constitutions. The state responded with a combined plea to the jurisdiction and motion for summary judgment asserting that Cox lacked standing and that sovereign immunity and applicable statutes of limitations barred Cox’s claims. The trial court granted the state’s plea as to Cox’s federal claims but denied it as to the remaining claims. Both parties appealed.
In an opinion by Justice Farris, the court of appeals affirmed the trial court as to the federal claims but reversed on all other claims based on sovereign immunity. First, the court considered Cox’s civil conversion claim, which was subject to the Tort Claims Act. Because the TCA does not waive immunity for intentional tort claims, the court quickly ruled that the trial court erred in not dismissing that claim for want of jurisdiction. Turning to the restitution claim, the court held that although Texas law recognizes restitution for a former judgment debtor “when an opposing party has collected property under a judgment that is subsequently reversed,” Cox failed to seek restitution “in the same suit after the judgment against him was reversed.” Instead, he filed a new lawsuit claiming more than $20 million. The court observed that “‘[r]etrospective monetary relief is generally barred’ by immunity,” a problem Cox attempted to evade by characterizing his claim as a “refund.” The court didn’t buy it and dismissed this claim.
Cox next argued that the state violated the due course of law provision of the Texas Constitution (art. I, §19). But, as the court pointed out, “the Texas Bill of Rights, which includes the due course of law provision, does not provide a private right of action for damages against the State.” Instead, a plaintiff can only seek equitable or injunctive relief, which Cox did not. The trial court erred again. The same went for Cox’s inverse condemnation claim. The court found the claim facially invalid because (1) the state, in collecting a judgment, did not have the requisite intent to damage Cox’s property or take it for public use, and (2) the state had a valid legal basis for collecting the judgment by selling Cox’s property (and Cox never challenged the turnover order in the first place). Consequently, the state did not commit a compensable taking. This claim, too, went by the boards.
Finally, the court upheld the trial court’s dismissal of Cox’s federal claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. First, SCOTX has held that “the State and its officials sued in their official capacities are immune from money damages sought in a Section 1983 claim unless they waive their immunity.” The Legislature hasn’t done that, so the State was immune as to that claim. Second, the court determined that Cox failed to plead a viable takings claim under the Fifth Amendment. Cox argued that federal takings claim are cognizable in Texas courts, but as the court pointed out, that claim has to be asserted as an independent cause of action (if one exists under state law), in this case an inverse condemnation claim under Texas law. Since the court previously poured out Plaintiff on inverse condemnation, he didn’t do that. The trial court did not err in dismissing those claims.
