The 15th Court of Appeals has dismissed the state’s lawsuit against the City of Kyle as moot because the city disannexed the property subject to the suit. The court preserved the state’s attorney’s fee claim under the Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act but dismissed its other fee claims arising from Chapter 43, Government Code, and the Open Meetings Act.
City of Kyle, Texas v. The State of Texas, Ex Rel. 1200 S. Old Stagecoach Road, LLC (No. 15-24-00011-CV; October 30, 2025) arose from a 2022 challenge mounted by the state against the validity of an annexation ordinance adopted by the city. The state filed leave to file a quo warranto proceeding, which the trial court granted, alleging that the ordinance was “void ab initio” because the city failed to comply with the statutory requirements under Chapter 43, Local Government Code. It further sought an injunction to prevent the city from enforcing the ordinance on the basis of Open Meetings Act violations. Finally, the state sought recovery of its reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees under Chapter 43 and TOMA. The city responded with a plea to the jurisdiction based on the city’s disannexation of the property in June 2023. The trial court denied the plea. The city sought interlocutory relief.
In an opinion by Justice Field, the court of appeals reversed in part and affirmed in part. The state argued that the city’s disannexation ordinance did not moot the controversy, since “substantive legal issues remain as to whether the Annexation Ordinance was void from the outset because the City violated Chapter 43 and TOMA during the annexation process.” The court rejected this argument, holding that the state no longer had a cognizable interest in the outcome of its requested relief because the ordinance no longer exists and the state did not seek damages, only declaratory and injunctive relief. Even “if the court were to decide the legal issues that the State identifies as ‘controversies,’ the court’s decisions on those issues would constitute impermissible advisory opinions.”
As to the state’s claim for attorney’s fees, the court observed that whether such a claim survives an otherwise moot appeal “depends first on whether the claimant seeks fees under a statute that authorizes an award of fees only to a prevailing party or, alternatively, under a statute that permits an award based on equity, regardless of who prevails” (citation omitted). In this case, Chapter 43 and TOMA give the court discretion to award attorney’s fees to the prevailing party. The question then became whether party seeking the fees “prevailed before the underlying substantive claim became moot” (citation omitted). Here the state’s claims became moot before it prevailed on any of them, mooting its attorney’s-fees claim. But under the UDJA, the trial court has discretion to award “equitable and just” attorney’s fees either way. In that case, the state’s “claim for fees presents a live controversy, even when the case is otherwise moot” (citation omitted). The trial court, consequently, did not err in denying the city’s pleas as to that claim.
