Neonatology Consultants of Corpus Christi, PLLC; Alfonso M. Prado, M.D.; Miguel A. DeLeon, M.D.; Euming Chong, M.D.; Jie Guo, M.D.; Vallier C. Ojadi, M.D. v. Felix Moya and Serena Lee Barragan, Individually and as Next Friends of XXXX, A Minor (No. 13-23-00300-CV; December 12, 2024) arose from a medical malpractice claim in which Plaintiffs alleged that a neonatology practice had negligently caused their newborn daughter serious and permanent injuries in their treatment of the infant’s prenatal heart defects. Plaintiffs served two expert reports in accordance with § 74. 351, CPRC, only one of which is relevant to this case. Defendants objected on the basis that the expert report failed to state the standard of care, breach, and causation and moved to dismiss. The trial court denied the motion. Defendants appealed.
In an opinion by (now Chief) Justice Tijerina, the court of appeals affirmed. Plaintiffs’ expert opined that the neonatology team that cared for her failed to promptly schedule cardiac surgery to repair her defects when the standard of care called for immediate surgical intervention. He opined further that the treating physicians (all of whom were neonatologists to whom the same standard of care applied) knew of her condition and still failed to schedule surgery. The treating physicians further failed to provide the infant with the proper respiratory support until the infant coded, which then required an extreme dose of PGE1 (a respiratory support medication for infants with certain heart conditions) that resulted in hypotension. Although there was a standing order for PGE1, the expert noted, the treating physicians allowed it to lapse and did not monitor the infant’s chart to make sure it was being administered. The court thus concluded that the expert report put Defendants on notice of the applicable standard of care and the specific ways in which they breached that standard. The court further held that even though only one report was served, it sufficiently put each defendant on notice. The court further held that the report satisfied the causation requirement because it sufficiently linked the breaches with the infant’s harm, which resulted from a significant delay in the performance of complex cardiac surgery and suboptimal conditions when the surgery was ultimately performed after the infant coded. This caused “permanent tissue damage” and “a lifetime impairment.” Concluding that the trial court abused its discretion in dismissing the case, the court remanded for further proceedings.
