The Texas Supreme Court has reversed a Dallas Court of Appeals decision (and eleven other court of appeals to go with it) that a 2003 amendment to the venue statutes granted interlocutory appellate jurisdiction over whether each plaintiff in a multi-plaintiff case independently established venue.
Rush Truck Centers of Texas, L.P. and Blue Bird Body Company v. Sean Sayre and Tori Sayre, Individually and as Representative of the Estate of Emory Sayre, Deceased (No. 24-0040; June 6, 2025) arose when a Blue Bird Body Company (“Blue Bird”) school bus hit and killed Plaintiffs’ daughter as she exited and crossed in front of it to get to her home in Parker County. Plaintiffs alleged the death was caused by the bus’s lack of safety features, specifically a crossing gate, and filed negligence and strict liability claims against its manufacturer, Blue Bird, and vendor, Rush Truck Centers of Texas, L.P. (“Rush”), who sold the bus to Brock I.S.D. out of its Dallas County office. Plaintiffs alleged that Rush “actually knew of a defect in the product” at the time of the sale and that the defective product caused the injury. Plaintiffs filed the suit in Dallas County on the basis that “a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the [said/aforementioned] claim occurred” there (citing § 15.002(a)(1), CPRC). Rush moved to transfer venue to Parker County, which the trial court denied. Rush sought interlocutory relief from the Dallas Court of Appeals, disputing where it “supplied” the bus and its knowledge of the alleged defect.
In an opinion by Justice Garcia, the court of appeals affirmed. Rush argued the bus was “supplied” in Parker County because the Rush employee who initiated the sales proposal to Brock ISD worked from home in Parker County, where the bus was delivered. It added that all other activities occurring in their Dallas County location were clerical and only tangentially related to the sale. The court, however, noting that, as the Plaintiffs put it, “[b]ookends are meaningless without the books,” opined that “suppl[ying]” the bus included not just its negotiation and final delivery, but also all the actions that made it possible. Since the bus was ordered, delivered, inspected, decalled, billed, and paid for out of Rush’s RBC-Dallas ,the court concluded that a considerable number of events transpired in Dallas County.
Rush contended that these “administrative tasks” could only bear on contract disputes, not products liability suits, but the court maintained those tasks were relevant to the Plaintiffs’ tort claim and, therefore, its venue analysis depended not on the nature of the claim, but rather Plaintiffs could support venue in Dallas County. Because a substantial part of the activities relevant to “suppl[ying]” the bus occurred out of Rush’s Dallas County office, venue was proper in Dallas County under § 15.002(a)(1). Rush sought review.
In an opinion by Justice Sullivan, the Court reversed and remanded to the trial court. The question before the Court was whether the court of appeals had jurisdiction to consider Rush’s interlocutory appeal of the trial court’s venue ruling. The statutory rule, § 15.064(a), CPRC, clearly states that “The court shall determine venue questions from the pleadings and affidavits. No interlocutory appeal shall lie from the determination.” That seems pretty clear, but in 2003 the Legislature carved out a narrow exception permitting an interlocutory appeal of “a trial court’s determination … a plaintiff did or did not independently establish proper venue.” § 15.003(b)(1), CPRC. Most courts of appeals (eleven, to be exact), according to Justice Sullivan, have held that in cases involving multiple plaintiffs § 15.003(b) permits an interlocutory appeal. Obviously, Rush argued the majority position. Only the San Antonio Court of Appeals has held otherwise that § 15.003(b) allows interlocutory appeals only if a trial actually and necessarily determines whether each plaintiff independently established proper venue.
The Court opted for the San Antonio Court of Appeals’s interpretation of the statute. First, Justice Sullivan pointed out, the statute doesn’t “automatically grant appellate jurisdiction just because multiple plaintiffs appear in a case.” That wouldn’t make any sense anyway because it would nullify the general rule in § 15.064. Second, the two provisions are reconcilable because § 15.003(b) “applies only to venue determinations to retain or transfer one of the plaintiffs within a suit—not to every venue determination that happens to involve multiple plaintiffs.” In this case, Plaintiffs asserted “identical claims, arising from identical facts, with identical venue grounds.” Since this is a “homogenous venue dispute,” § 15.064 controls. “The concern apparent from the text of Section 15.003,” wrote Justice Sullivan, “was the prevention of what’s known as ‘tag-along’ venue—where plaintiffs with no connection to their preferred venue join with a plaintiff who can establish proper venue there.” By contrast, in this case the plaintiffs have the same claim with the same venue facts. Consequently, “the trial court had no need to determine whether each plaintiff ‘independently’ established proper venue—their venue facts are indistinguishable.” Consequently, the court of appeals had no jurisdiction over the appeal.
Having been involved in the 2003 reform at issue in this case, we agree with the Court’s interpretation. Section 15.003(b) really was meant to deal with “tag-along” venue, not multiple plaintiff cases in which plaintiffs assert the same claims and venue facts. By the same token, we understand why so many courts of appeals read the statute the other way. Unfortunately for the plaintiffs, their case had to be the one that resolved the issue. We hope that things can get moving again, and they get their day in court as soon as possible.
