The El Paso Court of Appeals has applied an exemption to the Federal Arbitration Act for transportation workers actively engaged in interstate commerce.
In LKQ Automotive d/b/a Keystone Automotive Industries, Inc. and Jesus Duron v. Adan Robert Romo (No. 08-25-00104-CV; October 31, 2025), Romo filed suit against his his employer, LKQ, after sustaining injuries while on the job. The accident took place in April 2023 when Romo was allegedly struck from behind by a forklift operated by fellow LKQ employee, Peter Torres. Romo alleged that LKQ and Duron had failed to provide a safe work environment and were vicariously liable for his injury. Defendants filed a general denial and moved to compel arbitration. Defendants, non-subscribers to workers’ compensation, argued that the “Injury Benefit Plan For Texas Employees” contained a binding arbitration clause to resolve of work-related injury claims in accordance with the Federal Arbitration Act. Romo responded that he came within the “transportation worker” exemption to the FAA. He argued that the Texas Arbitration Act instead governed the agreement. Under the TAA, an arbitration agreement pertaining to personal injury claims can only be enforced if entered if entered on the advice of counsel and signed by both parties and their attorneys. Since LKQ gave Romo no opportunity to consult an attorney before signing, no attorney signed the agreement. Defendants did not challenge Romo’s affidavit to this effect. After a non-evidentiary hearing without a court reporter, the trial court denied the motion to compel. Defendants sought interlocutory relief.
In an opinion by Justice Soto, the court of appeals affirmed. The only issue before the court was whether Romo met his burden of showing that the transportation worker exemption applied to him. In a recent opinion, SCOTUS opined that the exemption applies to a worker “who is ‘actively engaged in [the] transportation’ of goods across borders via the channels of foreign or interstate commerce. Bissonnette v. LePage Bakeries Park St., LLC, 601 U.S. 246, 256 (2024). But the high court specified that the worker “must at least play a direct and ‘necessary role in the free flow of goods across borders’” without reference to the employer’s business. Id. at 253-54. Defendants argued that Romo was not so engaged, although the parties’ agreement specified that LKQ was “engaged in transactions involving interstate commerce” and that Romo’s “employment involved such commerce.” Defendants asserted that Romo’s affidavit omitted the locations of the LKQ warehouses to which Romo drove, so there was no way to identify whether Romo crossed a state line or simply shuttled between LKQ’s Texas facilities. The court, however, observed that the FAA exempts transportation workers engaged in the movement of goods in interstate commerce, “even if they do not cross state lines” (citations omitted). The question was “whether the transportation worker ‘is a constituent part’ of the interstate movement of goods or people rather than a ‘part of an independent and contingent intrastate transaction’” (citations omitted).
In this case, the goods transported by Romo never “came to rest” in a local warehouse, so they were never removed from the interstate commerce. Even if Romo never left the borders of the state, he nevertheless “transport[ed] auto parts between warehouses and load[ed] and [unloaded] those products while they [were] still in the course of their ongoing interstate journey.” Instead of “coming to rest” in local warehouses, the parts “were in the process of being shipped to other states, such as New Mexico and Arizona.” Romo thus qualified as a “constituent part of a stream of interstate commerce,” similar to Amazon drivers or airline cargo handlers who have been held to be exempt transportation workers. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by implicitly finding that the FAA exemption applied to Romo, especially in the absence of any controverting evidence offered by Defendants. And, since the parties’ arbitration agreement was not signed by counsel, the TAA didn’t apply, so the court found it unnecessary to reach the issue of whether it might otherwise apply to a transportation worker exempt from the FAA. The court thus affirmed the trial court’s order denying the motion to compel.
TCJL Intern Satchel Williams researched and prepares the first draft of this article.
