The Houston [14th] Court of Appeals has reversed and rendered judgment for the City of Houston in two similar Tort Claims Act cases.
The first case, City of Houston v. Sam J. Roy, (No. 14-24-00954-CV; February 5, 2026) arose from a 2023 between Plaintiff’s vehicle and a city-owned truck operated by a city employee. The city filed a Rule 91a motion to dismiss, arguing that Plaintiff failed to allege facts demonstrating that he provided formal notice of his claims to the city pursuant to § 101.101, CPRC. The trial court denied the motion. The second case, City of Houston v. Spendricka Farwell (No. 14-24-00876-CV; February 5, 2026), involved an accident between Plaintiff’s vehicle and a marked HPD vehicle. Once again, the city filed a Rule 91a motion to dismiss, which the (different) trial court granted the day after it was filed. But because Plaintiff had no opportunity to respond or participate in the hearing, the court granted her motion to reinstate the case with a note that it had granted the city’s motion in error. Upon reinstatement, the trial court denied the city’s motion. The city appealed both rulings.
In a pair of opinions by Justice McLaughlin, the court of appeals reversed and rendered judgment for the city. In Roy neither Plaintiff’s original or amended petition pleaded formal or actual notice pursuant to § 101.101. He thus “failed to allege facts showing that all jurisdictional prerequisites to suit had been satisfied,” so “the trial court erred in denying Houston’s motion to dismiss. City of Houston v. Twyman, No. 14-24-00159-CV, 2025 WL 1337574 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] May 8, 2025, no pet.) (mem. op.). Turning to the question of whether Plaintiff should be permitted to amend his pleading to cure the deficiency, the court concluded that Plaintiff, who responded to the city’s Rule 91a motion and served an amended pleading, still failed to plead jurisdictional facts. He thus had “a full and fair opportunity to amend his petition” and “is not entitled to another opportunity to amend.” And, as the court observed, he didn’t ask for another opportunity in any event. The court reversed and rendered, dismissing Plaintiff’s case with prejudice.
In Spendricka, the procedural posture was somewhat different. The city sought mandamus relief on the basis that the trial court’s plenary power expired before its reinstatement of the case. Consequently, the trial court’s reinstatement and subsequent orders were void, and the court of appeals had no jurisdiction. Here Plaintiff filed an unverified motion to reinstate, which the trial court granted more than 30 days after it was filed. But because the motion to reinstate didn’t arise from a dismissal for want of prosecution under TRCP 165a, the verification requirement for such a motion didn’t apply. Plaintiff’s motion for reinstatement was therefore akin to a motion for new trial or motion to modify the judgment, which extended the trial court’s plenary power over its dismissal order. The court thus denied mandamus relief.
Turning to the Rule 91a motion, the court once again found that Plaintiff had failed to plead that it provided notice of her claim within 90 days of the accident in accordance with Houston’s city charter and § 101.101. As in Roy, Plaintiff failed to plead jurisdictional facts, so the trial court erred in denying the city’s motion to dismiss. As to the question of allowing Plaintiff to amend her pleading, the court once again noted that Plaintiff responded to the city’s Rule 91a motion and amended her petition twice, both times without curing the jurisdiction problem. She thus had a full and fair opportunity to amend and wasn’t entitled to yet another bite at the apple. And, as in Roy, Plaintiff didn’t ask for that opportunity here. The court thus reversed and rendered judgment dismissing with prejudice Plaintiff’s claim.
