In a case of first impression, the Houston [14th] Court of Appeals has held that courts may not determine whether a plaintiff is a legal resident of Texas for purposes of the Texas-resident exception to the forum non conveniens statute if the plaintiff became a resident after suit was filed.
In re Grayson Mill Operating, LLC, Grayson Mill Energy, LLC, and Grayson Mill Williston, LLC (No. 14-25-00645-CV; February 26, 2026) arose from a wellsite explosion in Williston, North Dakota in 2023. Two employees injured in the accident filed suit in Harris County (another filed suit in North Dakota). Defendants responded with a motion to dismiss on FNC grounds. Subsequently, Plaintiffs added another defendant, Grayson Mill Williston, which filed its own FNC motion. Plaintiffs asserted the Texas-resident exception and that under the statute’s balancing test the case should be tried in Texas. A Harris county district court denied Defendants’ motions without stating the reasons therefor. It then denied Defendants motion for reconsideration. Defendants filed a petition for writ of mandamus.
In an opinion by Justice Wilson, the court conditionally granted the writ. Turning to § 71.051, CPRC, the court commended its analysis with the Texas-resident exception, which prohibits a trial court from staying or dismissing a plaintiff’s claim “if the plaintiff is a legal resident of [Texas].” § 71.061(b). Defendants argued that the exception only applies if Plaintiffs were Texas residents at the time of the incident giving rise to the injury or at the time they file suit. The court determined that it need not address the common, ordinary meaning of the term “legal resident of Texas” is because the parties disputed the point in time Plaintiffs became residents, not whether they were residents at all. No authority has addressed that question to date, so the court found itself in uncertain waters.
At the time of the accident, one Plaintiff resided in North Carolina and the other in Colorado. They represented that they moved to Houston in order to receive treatment for burns at the Texas Medical Center. But the court observed that “[t]he record is a bit murkier with respect to residency when the first two Grayson Mill entities filed their FNC motion on June 4, 2024.” By the time they joined the third Grayson Mill entity, both had moved to Houston. The court determined that there could be “at least four possible points at which the residency exception could be determined for purposes of the Texas-resident exception: 1. When the accident occurred; 2. When suit is filed; 3. When the FNC motion is filed; or 4. When the FNC motion is ruled on.” In Owens Corning v. Carter, 997 S.W.2d 560 (Tex. 1999), which considered the application of the old law asbestos-exemption, SCOTX observed that the general FNC provision in § 71.051 contained a Texas-resident exception, but the specific asbestos exception “made no distinction between residents and nonresidents at the time of filing” (the asbestos “loophole”). Based on this reasoning, the court concluded, “The Supreme Court of Texas thus implied that section 71.051€ referred to a plaintiff’s residency at the time suit is filed.”
The court further observed that “[i]f the Texas-resident exception applied when a plaintiff moves to Texas after the accident and after suit is filed, there is a potential for mischief.” To prevent such mischief in the diversity-of-citizenship context, for example, federal jurisdiction “depends on the state of things at the time of the action brought” (citation omitted). SCOTUS has adhered to this principle for more than 200 years, so it is pretty solid. The same goes for determination of personal jurisdiction, where SCOTX “has concluded that a court determining an objection to the exercise of personal jurisdiction, whether based on specific jurisdiction or general jurisdiction, may not consider a defendant’s contacts with Texas that occurred after the date on which suit was filed” (citations omitted).
Plaintiffs argued that the trial court must determine the legal residency question at the time of its ruling on the FNC motion but cited no authority for that position. The fact that the statute uses the present tense, as Plaintiffs argued, is neither here nor there because both the diversity jurisdiction statute and legal standards for specific jurisdiction are stated in the present tense as well. Both statutes bar a trial court from considering changes in residency after suit is filed. The court did not need to decide whether residency should be determined at the time Plaintiffs’ claims accrued or the time of filing “since neither of the Real Parties were legal residents of Texas when the accident occurred or when suit was filed.” In other words, the court recognized that under its ruling a plaintiff could still manipulate residency by waiting to file the lawsuit until “he had moved to Texas and firmly established roots here.” But the court also said that it didn’t need to decide that issue “at this time.”
Finally, the court performed the six-factor balancing test in § 71.051(b), CPRC. Because the Texas-resident exception didn’t apply, the trial court was required to consider whether to dismiss on FNC grounds according to that test. Defendants argued that all six factors favored FNC dismissal, since every relevant aspect of the case was in North Dakota. Plaintiffs argued that Grayson Mill Parties directed the Williston operations from their Houston headquarters but didn’t have any evidence supporting that claim. Thus, the court concluded that at least four factors supported dismissal: North Dakota provided an alternate forum, an adequate remedy, and could exercise jurisdiction over Defendants and dismissal of the Texas suit would not result in unnecessary duplication or proliferation. The court court further determined that since most of the witnesses and physical evidence was located in North Dakota (and a third Plaintiff was already litigating there), it would work a substantial injustice to move all that to Texas. And the public and private interest factors clearly favored North Dakota as the appropriate forum, since the well blowout occurred there and, as previously stated, the witnesses and equipment were there.
The trial court thus abused its discretion by impliedly determining that reconsideration should be denied on the ground that it was proper to deny the FNC motions based on either the Texas-resident exception or on a balancing of the six factors under § 71.051(b). It conditionally granted the writ and ordered the trial court to vacate its order denying dismissal and issue an order dismissing Plaintiffs’ claims under the doctrine of forum nonconveniens.
Justice McLaughlin concurred, adding only that “a trial court’s erroneous legal conclusion, even in an unsettled area of law, is an abuse of discretion.” He also agreed that “there is a ‘potential for mischief’ if a plaintiff’s residency is determined after the incident giving rise to the suit or after suit is filed.”
