The Business Court has rejected an attempt to remove a case to Business Court where defendants in a multi-million lease dispute missed the statutory deadline for filing their notice of removal.
DrinkPAK, LLC v. PRIII/Crow Building C, LP and Trammell Crow Company, LLC (2026 Tex. Bus. 27; May 14, 2026) arose from dispute between a lessee and lessor over foundation defects in a 1.3 million square foot building to be converted into a beverage manufacturing site. In July 2023 DrinkPAK entered into a lease agreement with PRIII to lease the building. DrinkPAK alleged that Trammell Crow, PRIII’s broker, communicated with it about the construction of the manufacturing facility but didn’t tell it about the building’s “slab failure, or threats of [foundation] compaction and sinking.” By October 2023, DrinkPAK allegedly discovered the foundation failures. The parties quickly came to blows, each sending the other demand letters for millions of dollars in damages. In November 2025 DrinkPAK sued PRIII and Trammell Crow in Denton County district court, asserting negligence, fraud, and breach of implied warranty. PRIII removed the lawsuit to federal court, but later the parties agreed to remand back to Denton County. Defendants then moved to remove to the Business Court. In March 2026 DrinkPAK moved to remand to the district court.
In an opinion by Judge Bullard, the court granted the motion to remand. DrinkPAK argued that Defendants’ removal notice was statutorily untimely, Defendants responded that DrinkPAK’s original petition didn’t specify an amount in controversy and that they quantified damages only after PRIII filed its counterclaim. The court agreed with DrinkPAK that the motion to remove was untimely. Although the removal notice invoked the Business Court’s jurisdiction, DrinkPAK opposed the removal. Because DrinkPAK didn’t consent to removal, Defendants had to file the notice “no later than 30 days after the later of (1) the date they were served with process or (2) the date they discovered facts establishing the Business Court’s jurisdiction.”
They didn’t do that. They missed the 30-day post-service deadline by two months. As to the discovery of facts establishing jurisdiction, the court observed that DrinkPAK’s petition alleged damages “over $1 million” in accordance with TRCP 47, which does not by itself establish the court’s jurisdiction. Looking to the petition, the lease agreement, and the parties’ presuit correspondence, the court found “no reasonable doubt that the amount in controversy exceeded $5 million well before Defendants filed their TBC removal notice. Therefore, Defendants discovered, or should have discovered, the jurisdictional facts no later than their respective service dates.”
First, the lease agreement obligated DrinkPAK to pay PRIII about $100 million over 12 years. “It is wholly unreasonable,” Judge Bullard wrote, “that Defendants—parties to a contract cumulatively netting them over $100 million—now claim they were unaware the amount in controversy would exceed $5 million.” At the very latest, Defendants became aware of DrinkPAK’s lawsuit when they were served in December 2025, triggering the court’s jurisdiction at that time. Second, the parties’ pre-suit correspondence put Defendants on notice that potential litigation could come under the court’s jurisdiction. Indeed, the correspondence showed that “Defendants knew DrinkPAK sought damages nearly 30 times higher than the Business Court’s jurisdictional threshold, even though it broadly pleaded relief ‘over $1,000,000.’”
Defendants tried to argue that PRIII’s counterclaim reset the removal clock, but nothing in the statute says that. “The Business Court,” Judge Bullard pointed out, “has established an action encompasses all claims and counterclaims.” Next they contended that since DrinkPAK’s petition broadly claimed damages over $1 million, they didn’t know that a cause of action existed that would trigger the removal clock. As the court pointed out, this is the same argument dressed up in different clothing, since it conflates “claim” with “cause of action.” To let a counter-plaintiff manipulate the court’s jurisdiction simply by filing a counterclaim would subvert the entire statute.
Defendants attempted another sally, arguing that the court couldn’t consider the parties’ pre-suit correspondence under TRE 408. To the contrary, “Rule 408 does not bar the admission of settlement offers when offered for another relevant purpose” (citations omitted), only when they are offered to show liability. DrinkPAK offered the demand letters not “to establish the monetary amount they are entitled to recover from Defendants,” but “to show Defendants’ knowledge as relevant to the statutory removal deadline.” The court granted DrinkPAK’s remand motion.
This is an important opinion for many reasons. From our standpoint, perhaps the most significant message it has for litigants is that the Business Court cannot be a party to any perception of forum shopping if it is to maintain its credibility. Put another way, its jurisdictional boundary has to transparent, objective, and inviolable.
