In a case transferred from the Austin Court of Appeals, the 15th Court of Appeals has reversed a Travis County trial court’s denial of an engineering firm’s motion to dismiss a personal injury case on the basis of a deficient certificate of merit.
Encotech Engineering Consultants, Inc. v. Ian Miramon and Caroline Miramon (No. 15-25-00173-CV; September 29, 2026) arose from an injury suffered by an Austin firefighter when he was struck in the head by a blade of an industrial-sized ceiling fan. The blow knocked him off the fire truck onto the concrete floor, causing serious injuries. Plaintiffs sued Encotech and others for negligence and gross negligence. They attached a certificate of merit by a professional engineer, as required by § 150.002, CPRC. Encotech filed a motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ negligence claims with prejudice because of deficiencies in the certificate of merit. The trial court denied the motion. Encotech sought interlocutory relief in the Austin Court of Appeals, but SCOTX transferred the case to the 15th Court for docket equalization.
In an opinion by Justice Farris, the court of appeals reversed and remanded to the trial court. Encotech argued that the certificate of merit was deficient because Plaintiffs’ expert did not satisfy the expert qualifications requirements to testify. It further asserted that the expert failed to identify “the specific conduct Encotech engaged in that led to Mr. Miramon’s injuries, instead making collective assertions of negligence against Encotech and other engineering firms.” The court first observed that “the certificate must specifically address ‘the conduct of the professional who provided the service at issue,’ and the certificate must ‘identify each defendant and that defendant’s specific conduct’” (citations omitted). Plaintiffs’ certificate failed this test because it “neither identifies which acts or omissions are ascribed to Encotech nor attests that the named engineering firms were involved in all aspects of the work.” Consequently, the certificate “amount[ed] to collective assertions of negligence against Encotech and other engineering firms, rendering [it] deficient.”
Plaintiffs contended that the certificate was adequate because Encotech “admitted [in its motion to dismiss] that it was involved in the work attested to in the certificate.” Assuming that it could look beyond the four corners of the certificate, the court read Encotech’s statement in the motion that it “provided mechanical, electrical and plumbing engineering services” to the station as failing “to identify specific conduct by Encotech that relates to the injury at issue.” In other words, Encotech did “not identify what, if any, mechanical, electric and plumbing services [it] provided in relation to the ceiling fan or apparatus at issue, only referencing Fire Station 51 generally” (emphasis added). Plaintiffs took one last swing, arguing that the trial court could reasonably have concluded that the certificate was “sufficient to determine that the Miramons’ complaint [was] not frivolous.” But, the court determined, none of the authorities cited by Plaintiffs applied. The court thus reversed the trial court and remanded to the trial court for a determination of whether dismissal should be with or without prejudice, as the statute permits.
