The Beaumont Court of Appeals has granted a conditional writ of mandamus ordering a Jefferson County district court to grant Energy Transfer’s motion for leave to designate the Texas Department of Transportation as a responsible third party in a personal injury lawsuit.
In re La Grange Acquistions, LP, Lonestar NGL Fractionators, LLC, Energy Transfer GC NGL Fractionators, LLC, Lonestar NGL Mont Belvieu, LP, Energy Transfer Mont Belvieu NGLS LP, and Energy Transfer Partners, L.P. (No. 09-23-00189-CV; delivered September 21, 2023) arose from a car wreck involving two vehicles. Three lawsuits stemming from the wreck were filed: one between the two drivers, another by a passenger in one of the vehicles against the above-named defendants, and a third by the second driver against the above-named defendants. The trial court consolidated the cases into the first-filed suit between the drivers (Alexander v. Hernandez) in August 2022, about eight months after the wreck. Two months prior to the consolidation, however, Energy Transfer served initial disclosures in the passenger’s lawsuit that identified Hernandez as a person who may be designated as a responsible third party. Later, in February 2023, Energy Transfer filed a motion for leave to designate TxDOT as a responsible third party. The passenger and Hernandez objected. The trial court denied the motion to designate. Energy Transfer sought relief.
The court of appeals conditionally granted the mandamus petition, finding that the trial court clearly abused its discretion and that Energy Transfer did not have an adequate remedy on appeal. Energy Transfer argued that its motion for leave to designate “cannot be denied for non-compliance with section 33.004(d) [CPRC} because the applicable statute of limitations has not expired.” The real parties in interest countered that “two limitations apply to section 33.004(d): (1) the two-year limitations period for filing tort claims [which Energy Transfer met]; and (2) the six-month notice requirement for filing claims against a governmental unit” under § 101.101(a), CPRC (the Texas Tort Claims Act). The court of appeals rejected this argument, holding that “the notice procedure found in section 101.101(a) [] is a jurisdictional requisite to a suit against a governmental unit, not an affirmative defense of limitations.” By filing its motion to designate within the two-year limitations period, therefore, § 33.004(d) did not apply and “TxDOT’s immunity under the Tort Claims Act does not affect its responsibility for purposes of the proportional responsibility provisions of Chapter 33” (citation omitted).
Energy Transfer likewise complied with Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 47, which sets out the pleading standard for a motion to designate an RPT. The motion described the specific facts, alleged TxDOT “was negligent in that it knew that hundreds of accidents had been reported for the site of the accident but failed to take any protective measures to address the dangerous roadway and traffic conditions, and that the accident could have been avoided if TxDOT implemented proper traffic control devices.” Even had Energy Transfer failed to plead sufficient facts regarding TxDOT’s liability, the court went on, the trial court still “lacked the discretion to deny the motion for leave to designate without first affording Energy Transfer the opportunity to replead, as Energy Transfer requested” (citation omitted). As the court ruled, “the trial court clearly abused its discretion by denying Energy Transfer’s motion for leave to designate TxDOT as a responsible third party. Allowing a case to proceed to trial without a properly requested responsible-third-party designation defeats the defendants’ right to have the jury determine the proportionate responsibility of all potential responsible parties, requiring a second trial.” Energy Transfer thus did not have an adequate remedy by appeal.
