The Beaumont Court of Appeals has overturned a trial court order denying a Missouri-based franchisor’s motion to dismiss an application for a TRO brought by its Texas franchisee in Jefferson County district court. The franchise agreement at issue required all claims to be brought in Missouri state or federal courts.
In re Equity One Franchisors, LLC (No. 09-26-00092-CV; April 2, 2026) arose from a dispute between a franchisor of independently owned insurance agencies and a franchisee. The franchise agreement contained non-competition and non-solicitation clauses, as well as a forum selection close designating Missouri state and federal court jurisdiction over disputes “arising out of or relating to” the agreement. In November 2019, Wolfe, the guarantor of compliance with the agreement, sold her interest in the franchise to Dishon. The franchisee and franchisor subsequently executed a Consent to Transfer, which likewise included a forum selection clause for state and federal courts in St. Louis County, Missouri. In consideration for the consent to transfer, Dishon and his partner executed a guarantee for compliance with the agreement, including the venue and jurisdiction requirements. The same thing happened in 2025 when John Dishon transferred his interest to his partner.
In early 2026, counsel for franchisor sent franchisee a cease-and-desist letter stating that franchisee had opened an insurance office “that is not a duly licenses franchisee” of the franchisee and that the new office violated the non-compete and non-solicitation provisions of the agreement. The franchisee responded by applying for a TRO and injunction in a Jefferson County district court. They filed a nearly identical application with the Jefferson County district clerk under a different case style, which the clerk assigned to a different court. The applications alleged that the franchisor was selling its business to another business (Brightway), which “markedly and negatively affected franchises by reducing revenues and commissions to their employees, and that infringing on the ability of [franchisee] to perform their work as insurance professionals” and cause irreparable harm to their financial situation. The second trial court signed an ex parte TRO restraining the franchisor from, inter alia, enforcing the agreement. The first district court then signed an order non-suiting the original application.
Shortly thereafter, the franchisor filed a motion to dismiss for improper forum and moved to reconsider or dissolve the TRO on various grounds. The franchisee responded by moving to extend the TRO so that they could produce witnesses for the hearing. It also asserted that requiring them to litigate in Missouri would cause “significant hardship and irreparable harm.” The trial court convened the hearing in February. Movants requested another two-week extension, to which the franchisor objected. The trial granted the extension. The franchisor gave notice of hearing for a hearing on its motion to dismiss. After the hearing, the trial court denied the franchisor’s motion to dismiss. After another extension of the TRO, the franchisor filed a petition for writ of mandamus.
In a per curiam opinion, the court of appeals partially granted the writ. The franchisor argued that the trial court abused its discretion by granting the motion to extend the TRO before ruling on its motion to dismiss for improper forum and by denying its motion. Beginning with the proposition that “[c]ontractual forum-selection clauses are generally enforceable in Texas,” the court looked to whether the franchisee’s application for a TRO constituted a dispute arising out of the franchise agreement. The court easily determined that it did because, among other things, “the Movants’ own [application] establish[ed]” as much. Additionally, all of the wrongful conduct alleged by the franchisee “[were] directly related to [the franchisor’s] demand for compliance with the terms of the Franchise Agreement and the Consent Agreements.” And, as the court noted, all agreements included forum-selection clauses.
Next, the court examined whether the franchisee had established any exception to the general rule. First, the franchisee alleged that it would be unreasonable and unjust to enforce the forum-selection clause because it would be inconvenient. On the other hand, the franchisee agreed to the deal, “represent[ing] … that the agreed forum is not so inconvenient that enforcing the clause will deprive either party of its day in court, whether for cost or other reasons” (citation omitted). Observing that SCOTX has enforced forum-selection clauses despite claims that “daily operations of a business would basically cease” or “chronic health problems” would preclude a plaintiff to pursue her claims in other jurisdictions, the court stated that “[t]he normal demands of running a business and raising a family are not the sort of inconveniences that make a forum-selection clause unenforceable.” The court concluded that as a matter of law, the franchisee failed to establish that “the selected forum would be seriously inconvenient for trial, or that litigating in Missouri would be unreasonable or unjust.” The franchisee then tried the “contravention of public policy” approach. That didn’t fly, either
The court determined that the trial court abused its discretion by denying the motion to dismiss as to the Dishons and their agency, the parties bound by the forum-selection clauses. It further ruled that the trial court abused its discretion by entering the order extending the TRO with respect to those parties.
