Judge Stacy Sharp
The Business Court has granted a defense plea to the jurisdiction on the basis that it didn’t have concurrent jurisdiction over the action with a district court that had already appointed a receiver in the same case.
John J. (“Jay”) Parker, Jr., Individually and on Behalf of John J. (“Jack”) Sr., Parker and Country Club Management Group, Inc. & Tapatio Springs Family Real Estate Investments, LP & Tapatio Springs Family Utility Management, LLC, Tapatio Springs Family Utility Management, LP v. Lynzara-Austin Real Estate Management, LLC & Robyn Real Estate Investments, LP, Robyn Utility Investments Management, LLC (2026 Tex. Bus. 62; September 4, 2026) arose from the failure of a business relationship between Plaintiff John J. Parker and Michael Shalit concerning the operation of the Tapatio Springs Gold Resort and other real-estate developments in Kendall County. Litigation commenced in 2012 in a Kendall County district court, which placed the relevant business entities in a receivership in 2018. Plaintiffs filed suit in the Business Court seeking an appointment of a liquidating receiver over Tapatio Springs Real Estate Holdings, Tapatio Springs Utility Holdings, and Kendall County Development Company. They also asked the court to issue an order directing those entities dissolution, winding up, and termination. Defendants moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction and, alternatively, for an abatement.
In an opinion by Judge Sharp, the court granted Defendants’ motion. The question was whether the Business Court had concurrent jurisdiction with the Kendall County district court over the action for the partnerships’ receivership and dissolution. First, the court determined that “a district court in the county in which a domestic partnership’s registered office or principal place of business is located has jurisdiction to appoint a receiver for the entity.” § 11.402(b), BOC. The district court may also order liquidation and “appoint a receiver to effect the liquidation.” § 11.405(a), BOC. Consequently, under the BOC, only the district court in the entity’s county of residence can appoint a liquidating receiver and order a winding up and termination. And, since the Business Court has concurrent jurisdiction with the district court to the extent the entity’s resides in a county within one of the Court’s operating divisions.
So, given that a receivership action was already pending in Kendall County when Plaintiffs filed suit, can the Business Court butt in? The answer was no. Under § 11.408(b), BOC, “[a] court that appoints a receiver under this subchapter for the property or business of a domestic entity has exclusive jurisdiction over the domestic entity and all of its property, regardless of where the property is located.” That jurisdiction continues until the court relinquishes it or “the receiver is discharged and the property is restored to the persons who are entitled to it.” In this case, the Kendall County district court had not “relinquished” its jurisdiction but instead extended the existing receiverships “until further orders or until exhaustion of any appeals of the court’s judgment.” (In a severed part of the case, Defendant Michael Shalit has filed a petition for review with SCOTX.) No question that the Kendall County court maintained its exclusive jurisdiction under the BOC.
Plaintiffs tried to argue that the general grant of jurisdiction over receivership cases in the CPRC allowed them to file in the Business Court. But, since a specific jurisdictional statute prevails over a general one, the BOC controlled. The Business Court thus concluded that it didn’t have concurrent jurisdiction in this case. This would be true even in the absence of § 11.408 pursuant to the exclusivity doctrine. And since Kendall County is outside the Business Court’s reach, the Court couldn’t “derive its concurrent jurisdiction” in the first place. Plaintiffs were left with a choice of either transferring to a court of proper venue or dismissal without prejudice. Plaintiffs didn’t make a selection, so the Court dismissed Plaintiffs’ claim without prejudice.
