The Business Court has ruled that the exclusion of “this state” or “a political subdivision of this state” from the court’s jurisdiction does not extend to a state agency.
The University of Texas MD Anderson Cancer Center v. UnitedHealthcare of Texas, Inc. (2026 Tex. Bus. 77; October 28, 2026) arose from a contractual dispute between MD Anderson and UnitedHealthcare. MD Anderson filed suit in Harris County district court. United removed the action to the Business Court. Anderson moved to remand on the basis that the court had no subject-matter jurisdiction over suits by or against governmental entities. United opposed the motion, arguing that the Legislature didn’t include state agencies in Chapter 25A’s definition of “governmental entity.”
In an opinion by Judge Barnard, the court denied the motion to remand. The statute defines “governmental entity” to include “this state” or “a political subdivision of this state, including a municipality, a county, or any kind of district.” § 25A.004(g)(1)(A), Government Code. The parties agreed that Anderson is a state agency, not a political subdivision. The question then became “whether the Legislature’s reference to ‘this state’ in subsection (A) encompasses MD Anderson in its capacity as a state agency.” The court looked to other statutory definitions of “state agency” or “governmental unit,” observing that “Government Code section 572.002(10) defines ‘state agency’ to include certain executive-branch entities and university systems or institutions of higher education,” while “Civil Practice and Remedies Code section 101.001(3)(A) defines ‘governmental unit’ to include the State and the agencies and other governmental institutions that collectively constitute its government.”
But simply listing which entities are covered doesn’t tell us what “this state” means in Chapter 25A. For example, § 22.220(d)(1), Government Code, gives the 15th Court of Appeals exclusive intermediate appellate jurisdiction over “matters brought by or against the State or a board, commission, department, office, or other agency in the executive branch of state government, including a university system or institution of higher education.” In Baumgardner v. Brazos River Auth., 714 S.W.3d 597 (Tex. 2025), SCOTX ruled that the river authority didn’t fall within this definition. The Legislature, the Court observed, chose to expressly include institutions of higher education but to exclude river authorities. Absent express statutory language, the Court declined to “expand[] the jurisdictional provision to reach an otherwise unenumerated category of entities.”
Judge Barnard pointed out that the Legislature enacted both Chapter 25A and § 22.220 in 2023 with different definitions. The court found this “persuasive evidence that it distinguishes between a reference to the State and an express extension of jurisdictional consequences to particular state institutions.” Anderson “relie[d] on decisions recognizing that state agencies and public universities are governmental entities entitled to sovereign immunity,” but the court found those decisions inapposite because they didn’t construe § 25A.004. That statute deals with which courts can hear which cases, not whether certain governmental entities can be sued. And that statute refers to “the State and its political subdivisions while omitting state agencies and institutions of higher education. In other provisions—including a closely related jurisdictional statute—the Legislature expressly identified those institutions when prescribing the legal consequences applicable to them.” Taking the position that the Legislature could have written the statute to include state agencies if it had wanted to, the court declined to read MD Anderson into the statute.
The court thus denied MD Anderson’s motion to remand.












