Gloria Trevi
In a case that has been shuttling between trial and appellate courts since 2009, the Corpus Christi Court of Appeals has ruled that Gloria de Los Angeles Trevino Ruiz, known also as Gloria Trevi, can proceed on some of her defamation claims against several Mexican television broadcasters whose over-the-air signals travel into parts of Texas.
Azteca International Corporation d/b/a Azteca America, Stations Group, LLC, Northstar McAllen License, LLC, TV Azteca, S.A.B. De C.V. Publimax, S.A. De C.V. and Patrica Chapoy v. Gloria de Los Angeles Trevino Ruiz, Angel Gabriel de Jesus Trevino, and Armando Ismael Gomez Martinez (No. 13-21-00241-CV; filed December 29, 2022) arose from television broadcasts, primarily a program called Ventaneando, around the 10th anniversary of a scandal involving Trevi, her husband (a criminal defense attorney who represented her), and her son Gabriel. In 2009, Trevi filed suit in Hidalgo County alleging that some of the statements made on the broadcasts defamed her and her minor son. Defendants filed special appearances, which the trial court denied. Both the Corpus Christi Court of Appeals and the Texas Supreme Court affirmed the trial court, allowing the trial to proceed. See TV Azteca, S.A.B. De C.V., Patrica Chapoy, and Publimax, S.A. De C.V. v. Gloria De Los Angeles Trevino Ruiz, Individually and on Behalf of A Minor Child, A.G.J.T., and Armando Ismael Gomez Martinez (No. 14-0816; decided February 26, 2016).
Defendants then moved to dismiss Trevi’s claims pursuant to the Texas Citizens Participation Act (Ch. 27, CPRC). The trial court denied the motion. On an interlocutory appeal the Corpus Christi Court of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part, finding that the TCPA motion was untimely but that other statements Trevi alleged to be defamatory were made outside the one-year statute of limitations and should be dismissed. TV Azteca, S.A.B. de C.V. v. Trevino Ruiz, 611 S.W.3d 24 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi-Edinburg 2020, no pet.). Back at the trial court, defendants filed a motion for summary judgment as to 31 allegedly defamatory statements still in the case and a TCPA motion to dismiss nine of those statements which plaintiffs had added to their amended petition. The trial court deferred ruling on these motions until the close of evidence at trial. Defendants filed yet another interlocutory appeal.
This time around the court of appeals split the baby, reversing the trial court as to the majority of the statements but affirming as to the remainder. Initially, the court held that it had jurisdiction over the interlocutory appeal because, by deferring a ruling until the close of evidence, the trial court implicitly denied the defendants’ summary judgment and TCPA motions. Next, the court reversed the trial court’s denial of summary judgment as to 21 allegedly defamatory statements made outside the one-year statute of limitations for malicious prosecution, libel, slander, or breach of promise of marriage. § 16.002(a), CPRC. Plaintiffs argued that these claims should proceed despite being time-barred because they also involved claims about Trevi’s son, so defendants would have to defend them anyway. The court rejected this reasoning, finding “no case law or authority to suggest that a plaintiff can join another plaintiff’s claims merely because the defendants will already be defending that claim.” (This may be one of the most bizarre appellate arguments for end-running a limitations problem we’ve ever seen.)
The court then proceeded to an analysis of the remaining statements. As mentioned above, Trevi’s husband Gomez was the criminal defense lawyer who defended her against a murder charge in Mexico (she ended up serving more than four years in prison before her conviction was reversed). Gomez alleged that some of the defamatory statements were “of and concerning” him, although they never identified him by name. Texas law states that “[A] publication is ‘of and concerning the plaintiff’ if persons who knew and were acquainted with [the plaintiff] understood from viewing the publication that the defamatory matter referred to [the plaintiff]” (citations omitted). The court did not buy this argument, either, and reversed the trial court as to Gomez’s claims.
Regarding Trevi’s son Gabriel’s claims, however, the court of appeals found that some of them could not as a matter of law be deemed non-defamatory but would have to go to the fact finder. These statements referred to the son’s paternity, which the court determined could be interpreted in ways adverse to him. The trial court thus did not err in refusing to dismiss those statements as to Gabriel. Similarly, the court rejected defendants’ argument that those statements were “substantially true” (the actionable term in the statements was “bastard”) because the statements may have both nondefamatory and defamatory meaning from a viewer’s standpoint. Finally, the court rejected defendants’ argument that certain statements Trevi alleged as defamatory were covered by the group libel doctrine, which holds that “a plaintiff has no cause of action for a defamatory statement directed to some of, but less than, the entire group when there is nothing to single out the plaintiff” (citations omitted). While the statements in question did not explicitly name Trevi, they nevertheless referred to one person, not a group of persons. Moreover, neither the privilege of fair reporting of third-party allegations nor non-actionable rhetorical hyperbole applied to the statements, which included accusations of murder (a statement that “is capable of being proved true or false”) and other crimes together with the commenter’s opinion about their veracity. In sum, three statements concerning Trevi and and seven concerning Gabriel survived summary judgment. All of Gomez’s claims, however, failed.
Oddly, even though the court apparently had the defendants’ TCPA appeal before it (it even recited the applicable law), it only decided the summary judgment issues as to each statement. We’re not sure what happened there, but it could be that the court’s analysis of the essential elements of a defamation claim as to each statement, as well as the applicability of the limitations defense, dealt with the TCPA motion as well. Still, the opinion doesn’t state that. In any event, this case is now entering its 14th year of residence in the Texas court system. It features three appellate opinions on pretrial matters, which includes an important SCOTX decision approving the extension of our courts’ personal jurisdiction over media entities based in Mexico that broadcast into the state. It has further contributed to our jurisprudence around the TCPA and defamation. And all before ever getting to the jury. Whether the case will ultimately get to a jury remains to be seen, but if it does we will be very interested in how jurors evaluate the effect of statements made almost a decade-and-a-half ago.
