Texas Laurel Ridge Hospital, L.P. d/b/a Laurel Ridge Treatment Center v. Belinda Mainor and Michael Mainor, Individually and as Next Friend of J.B., A Minor Child (No. 13-23-00036-CV; May 16, 2024) arose from an incident in which a minor child enrolled in a treatment program for youth with behavioral issues was left asleep in the back of a locked van for several hours. She eventually escaped by kicking out a window and was returned to the treatment facility by an employee. Parents sued the facility for negligence and gross negligence, seeking damages for medical expenses, physical pain, mental anguish, and physical impairment. The parties joined issue at the trial court over whether Parents’ claims constituted Chapter 74 health care liability claims that required an expert report. Following a hearing, the trial court signed an order concluding that the claims were not Chapter 74 claims. Defendants filed an interlocutory appeal.
In an opinion by Justice Peña, the court of appeals affirmed. Defendants claimed that the second element of the definition of a health care liability claim in § 74.001(1)(13), which includes in the definition a claim based on a departure from accepted standards of care for “safety or professional or administrative services directly related to health care,” applied in this case. Citing SCOTX precedent, the court noted that “[a] safety standards-based claim against a physician or health care provider is a health care liability claim only if a ‘substantive nexus’ exists between the ‘safety standards allegedly violated and the provision of health care’” (citations omitted). Reviewing the non-exclusive list of factors (the Ross factors) courts should use to determine the nexus issue, the court concluded that only one of them was satisfied here: that at the time of the injury “the claimant was in the process of receiving health care.” First, Defendants’ alleged negligence of leaving the minor in a locked van “did not occur in the course of performing tasks with the purpose of protecting patients from harm” (i.e., this was not a “negligent transportation” case, which has been held to constitute a health care liability claim). Additionally, the minor’s injuries arose after the van reached its destination, not en route. Second, the van itself was not “a place that patients might be during the time they were receiving care.” Third, leaving a child in a child-locked vehicle violates a “general” standard of care applicable to everybody, not just health care providers. Fourth, the van was not an “instrumentality used in providing health care.” And finally, Defendants could point to no specific regulatory safety standard for private mental health facilities dealing with leaving children in locked vehicles. The court thus concluded that Plaintiffs’ claims were not health care liability claims subject to Chapter 74.
