The Corpus Christi Court of Appeals had granted a health care provider’s mandamus petition ordering a Hidalgo County district court to rule on its motion to dismiss for failure to serve an expert report in a health care liability action.
In re Regency Nursing Center Partners of Edinburg Ltd. (No. 13-25-00449; October 8, 2025) arose from the death of Martina Gonzalez, a patient at Regency who suffered severe bedsores which went septic. Following her death, real party in interest Aida Villareal filed an original petition asserting malpractice against Regency on April 27, 2021. However, Regency was not served with Villareal’s lawsuit until February 1, 2023. Regency filed an original answer and a verified denial, and then moved to dismiss Villareal’s lawsuit under the Chapter 74 because she had not filed an expert report and curriculum vitae within the 120-day period. The trial court held a hearing on the motion on September 19, 2023 (for which Villareal’s counsel was absent), where Regency again urged the court to dismiss the suit. The trial court informed Regency that the motion was granted, that it would be awarded attorney’s fees, and that it would sign the order later that day. The trial court did not sign that or any other order.
Regency submitted another proposed order of dismissal to the trial court on October 21, 2024, more than year after the hearing. Later that year, Villareal filed a motion to set aside the motion to dismiss, suggesting without evidence or authority that Regency’s proposed order was not timely filed and that Regency had intentionally evaded service to keep her from filing an expert report. Regency responded, reiterating its earlier arguments and denying that it evaded service or hindered Villareal. Another hearing followed, in which Villareal alleged the existence of a an expert report that had been provided to the parties preceding litigation. The only problem was that Plaintiff’s counsel didn’t know where it was or who had it. The trial court took Plaintiff’s motion under advisement, promising a fruling in two weeks. No ruling materialized. Instead, the court issued a notice stating the case would be heard on its dismissal docket on August 26, 2025. On August 29, 2025, Villareal filed a second amended petition and motved for a telephonic docket control conference. The following month, the trial court issued an order requiring mediation within 45 days, setting the case for a preferential jury trial on October 24th, 2025, and prohibiting any further motions or extensions. Regency moved to reconsider, to no avail. Regency filed a petition for writ of mandamus and moved to stay the trial court proceedings.
In an opinion by Justice Cron, the court granted the writ. In order to obtain relief for the trial court’s failure to rule on a motion, the relator must establish: “(1) the motion was properly filed and the trial court had a legal duty to rule; (2) the relator requested a ruling on the motion; and (3) the trial court failed or refused to rule within a reasonable time” (citations omitted). To determine whether a reasonable time for the trial court to act has elapsed, the court reviewed the circumstances of the case, observing that the record supported the conclusion that the trial court “received, was aware of, and was asked to rule on its motion to dismiss.” See In re Blakeney, 254 S.W.3d 659, 661 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2008, orig. proceeding). Additionally, the trial court abused its discretion by failing to rule on Regency’s motion to dismiss for more than two years, in violation of the express purpose of Chapter 74 to reduce expense and unwarranted delay and dispose of frivolous claims early in the litigation process. See Abshire v. Christus Health Se. Tex. 563 S.W.3d 219, 223 (Tex. 2018) (per curiam). Villareal argued that mandamus was improper because Regency merely “disagreed” with the trial court’s decision. The court rejected this argument, reminding Villareal that the trial court’s consideration of a motion is a ministerial act, and mandamus may issue to compel the trial court to act (citations omitted).
Plaintiffs next contended that an abuse of discretion did not occur because the order barring further motions was issued in tandem with an order for a preferential trial setting. This argument relied on an assertion of the trial court’s broad discretion over its own docket. But, as the court pointed out, Regency had filed its motion to dismiss two years prior to the preferential trial setting order, and it remained pending when the trial court issued its “no further motions” order. Next, Villareal asserted res ipsa loquitur in an attempt to avoid Chapter 74’s expert report requirement altogether. The court pointed out that Texas courts have universally rejected this line of reasoning and it thus merited little discussion. Finally, Villareal contended that Regency had an adequate remedy on appeal, but in McAllen Hosps., L.P., 2020 WL 2611272 the court ruled that appeal is not an adequate remedy for a trial court’s refusal to rule on a Chapter 74 motion to dismiss. The court concluded the trial court abused its discretion by failing to issue a written ruling on Regency’s motion to dismiss within a reasonable time and Regency lacked an adequate remedy via appeal. Accordingly, it conditionally granted relief and lifted the stay.
TCJL Intern Satchel Williams researched and drafted this article.
