The Dallas Court of Appeals has affirmed a trial court order denying an employer’s motion to compel arbitration in a dispute with a former employee who alleged sexual assault in the workplace.
Whataburger Restaurants, LLC and Ashraf Uzzaman v. Grace Garcia (No. 05-24-00093-CV; October 15, 2026) arose from a dispute between Whataburger and a former employee. The employee alleged that during her employment, Uzzaman, the operating partner, engaged in unwanted, unwelcome, and non-consensual sexual contact with her at the workplace. The employee filed suit, asserting sexual assault and hostile work environment, retaliation, assault and battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligent hiring, retention,, and supervision, and gross negligence. Defendants answered and moved to compel arbitration pursuant to the employee’s employment contract. The trial court denied the motion. Defendants appealed.
In an opinion by Justice Breedlove, the court affirmed and remanded to the trial court. The arbitration agreement at issue provided that the FAA applied to any dispute, including claims of harassment. The employee countered that her claims fell within the federal End Forced Arbitration of Sexual Assault and Sexual Harassment Act of 2021, 9 U.S.C. §§ 401-02 (EFAA). That statute overrides predispute arbitration agreements if “the person alleging conduct constituting sexual harassment dispute or sexual assault dispute” elects litigation instead. For purposes of the statute, a “sexual assault dispute” means “a dispute involving a nonconsensual sexual act or sexual contact, .. including when the victim lacks capacity to consent.” If the person alleging the contact invalidates the arbitration agreement, the EFAA also bars a motion to arbitrate any other claims in the case.
Did the EFAA apply to the employee’s claim? The first question was “whether claims of sexual harassment or sexual assault have been ‘plausibly pled’ to invoke the application of the EFAA.” Rather than applying the standard prescribed by FRCP 12(b)(6) pleading standards, as Defendants urged, the court observed that the trial court’s ruling and the scope of its review on appeal were governed by the Texas rules. That meant application of the fair notice pleading standard. Looking next to the federal definitions of “sexual assault dispute,” which involves either a nonconsensual sexual act or sexual contact. “Sexual contact” means “the intentional touching, either directly or through the clothing, of the genitalia, anus, groin, breast, inner thigh, or buttocks of any person with an intent to abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade, or arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person.” 18 U.S.C.A. § 2246(3).
Defendants argued that that the employee’s allegations didn’t “rise to the level of sexual assault as defined in the EFAA.” It further contended that her allegations under the Texas Labor Code (§§ 21.105 and 21.055) didn’t allude to sexual assault. The employee also filed a Charge of Discrimination with the Texas Workforce Commission, which detailed specific acts of unwelcome sexual contact, including touching her thigh and buttocks. The court found this evidence compelling, concluding that the employee’s “pleading pertained to a sexual assault dispute as defined in the EFAA.” Her pleading “alleged ‘severe and pervasive’ ‘unwelcome and non-consensual physical contact and sexual conduct’ directed toward her, actions that fall within 18 U.S.C.A. § 2246’s definition of ‘sexual contact.’” And because the employee sufficiently pled sexual assault under EFAA, her the remainder of her claims were no longer subject to mandatory arbitration. The court affirmed the trial court’s decision and remanded to the trial court.
