The Dallas Court of Appeals has affirmed a trial court order dismissing a defamation case under the Texas Citizens Participation Act (Ch. 27, CPRC).
Samella Anderson v. Elma Z. Goodwin (No. 05-23-00343-CV; February 22, 2024) arose from a nasty altercation between members of a homeowners association. After an exchange of bitter words, Goodwin spread a false rumor that Anderson threatened to kill Goodwin with a deadly weapon. Goodwin then made a police report accusing Anderson of displaying a silver handgun and pointing it at her. She sought a peace bond at the local JP court, which resulted in dismissal of the case for lack of probable cause. Police eventually arrested Anderson for felony aggravated assault with a deadly weapon. In the criminal case, Anderson was found not guilty.
The exonerated Anderson sued Goodwin for defamation, abuse of process, and malicious prosecution. Goodwin counterclaimed for assault and filed a TCPA motion to dismiss, which the trial court granted. The trial court also awarded Goodwin attorney’s fees of almost $21,000. Anderson appealed.
In an opinion by Justice Garcia, the court of appeals affirmed. Anderson raised two issues on appeal: (1) whether the trial court erred by granting Goodwin’s TCPA motion because Goodwin did not show that Anderson’s claims were based on or in response to Goodwin’s exercise of a TCPA-protected right; and (2) whether the trial court erred by granting Goodwin’s TCPA motion because Anderson established by clear and specific evidence a prima facie case for her claims.
As to the first issue, the court concluded that Anderson’s claims were based on or in response to Goodwin’s exercise of the right of free speech and the right to petition. All of Anderson’s claims involved communications by Goodwin that are matters of public concern because Goodwin was reporting criminal acts. Thus, Goodwin carried her step-one burden. As to the second issue, the court determined that Anderson failed to establish the causation element of her malicious prosecution claim. Anderson claimed that Goodwin caused Anderson’s prosecution and initiated the criminal prosecution by making a false police report. The court rejected this argument, noting that “initiate” means filing formal charges, not making a police report, so Goodwin could not have “caused” the prosecution. The court next turned to whether Anderson showed causation under the “procurement theory,” which required her to prove that Goodwin provided information that she knew was false and that, absent the false information, the prosecution would not have occurred. The court found that nothing in the police report substantiated Anderson’s claim. To the contrary, several months passed between the police report and Anderson’s arrest, which was carried out pursuant to a grand jury indictment. The court declined to speculate that Goodwin was the sole reason for Anderson’s arrest and held that Anderson failed to carry her step-two burden.
Finally, the court addressed Goodwin’s affirmative defenses in her TCPA motion, since the trial court’s dismissal order did not state any specific grounds. Goodwin asserted two affirmative defenses, limitations and absolute privilege, that barred Anderson’s abuse-of-process claim and her defamation claim. Presuming that the trial court considered every ground asserted by the movant, the court concluded that the trial court may have dismissed Anderson’s claims based on Goodwin’s affirmative defenses. It thus became unnecessary for the court to address whether Anderson fulfilled step two of the TCPA as to her defamation and abuse-of-process claims. Finally, the court upheld Goodwin’s attorney’s fees award.
