In a case involving the involuntary detention of plaintiff by a mental health hospital, the Dallas Court of Appeals has affirmed a trial court’s summary judgment order dismissing plaintiff’s DTPA claim against the hospital. The court, however, held further that plaintiff’s false imprisonment claim could proceed.
Marvella Loya v. Hickory Trail Hospital, L.P. (No. 05-20-00378-CV) arose from a Loya’s visit to Hickory, an inpatient mental-health facility, for dosage advice and counseling services regarding side effects of her depression medication. The hospital refused to allow her to leave and filed a temporary application for court-ordered mental health services that included a physician’s certificate of medical examination for mental illness. The mental-health court issued a detention order pending a probable cause hearing, which was held 3 days later. The court determined that Loya did not present a substantial risk of serious harm to herself and ordered her immediate release. She returned to the facility and was released “against medical advice.” She subsequently sued Hickory for false imprisonment and unconscionable conduct under the DTPA. The trial court granted Hickory’s motion for summary judgment as to all claims. Loya appealed.
The court of appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part. First, with respect to plaintiff’s DTPA claim, the court held that § 74.004, CPRC, barred the claim. That section exempts physicians and other health care providers from DTPA liability for personal injury or death allegedly resulting from the provider’s negligence. Loya argued that because Hickory’s intentional acts formed the basis of the claim, Chapter 74 did not apply. The court of appeals’ analysis rested on SCOTX’s decision in Sorokolit v. Rhodes, 889 S.W.2d 239 (Tex. 1994), which construed § 74.004’s predecessor statute to mean that no DTPA claims could be brought against a physician “if the alleged DTPA claim is . . . based on the physician’s breach of an accepted standard of care.” In other words, according to the court, “a plaintiff may not recast her negligence claim as a DTPA claim to avoid [Chapter 74’s] provisions.”
Here, the court opined that the “gravamen of Loya’s DTPA claim is that Hickory took advantage of her by admitting her as an inpatient despite her seeking only a change to her prescription.” But that question was so “integral to the rendition of medical services” as to constitute “a breach of the standard of care applicable to health care providers.” Chapter 74 thus applied to bar her claim. Hickory made a similar argument regarding Loya’s false imprisonment claim, which was based on the same facts and recast a negligence claim and an intentional tort claim. The court disagreed, reasoning that “nothing in [Chapter 74] [suggests] that a plaintiff whose claim meets the definition of a health care liability claim may assert only a negligence cause of action and failure to do so must result in dismissal.” By contrast, Chapter 74 applies to a health care liability claim sounding in both tort and contract, and if the legislature had intended for the plaintiff to plead on a negligence cause of action, “it knew how to say so.” Hickory’s cited authority stated as much, saying only that a plaintiff could not recase a health care liability claim as another cause of action to avoid the requirements of Chapter 74. Loya instead filed a Chapter 74 expert report as required by statute, so the question became whether her evidence created a genuine issue of material fact for each element of her false-imprisonment claim.
The court ultimately remanded to the trial court for consideration of Loya’s false imprisonment claim. This case presents yet another exercise in the construction and application of Chapter 74, this time to an intentional tort. It’s been two decades since the legislature enacted Chapter 74, and we are still working out the full scope of the statute.
