Justice Emily Miskel
The Dallas Court of Appeals has affirmed summary judgment against a defendant in a breach of contract action who complained that the judgment insufficiently identified him as the liable party in violation of Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 306.
Richard Panchasarp, Individually and as Trustee for the Richard J. Panchasarp Trust v. Snively Royalty Analysis, LLC (No. 05-23-00474-CV; August 21, 2025) involves the third appeal of a breach of contract action arising from a 2013 engagement letter in which Snively agreed to review Panchasarp’s past and current royalties, identify payment errors, and recover underpayments for a 50% split of the amount recovered. The agreement terminated upon completion of the review and payment of any underpayments or 12 months from the date the agreement was signed. Both parties signed the letter. Panchasarp, as trustee of the Panchasarp trust, owned royalty interests in Johnson County. The engagement letter didn’t refer to Panchasharp as a trustee or the trust itself. Nevertheless, Snively reviewed those interests and, representing herself as an authorized agent of Panchasarp’s trust, secured a recovery payment from Chesapeake of $355,954.46. The check was made out to “Richard J Panchasarp TR” and included the most recent monthly revenue distribution and the correction payment. Snively invoiced Panchasarp $163,035, which Panchasarp paid.
Several months later, Chesapeake sent another check made payable to “Richard J Panchasarp Tr” for $1,177,596.06. The parties disputed whether this amount fell under the provisions of their agreement as an underpayment correction, “further benefits due to errors corrected” (which the agreement stated would go 100% to Panchasharp), or some other payment. When Panchasarp refused to pay Snively’s invoice for 50% of the money, she sued Panchasarp individually and as trustee for the Richard J. Panchasarp Trust, alleging breach of contract. Panchasarp disavowed the agreement because he, in his trustee capacity, was not a signatory to the agreement and that it didn’t cover recoveries by the trust. Eventually, after the case had ended in a summary judgment that the court of appeals later reversed, the parties received a new trial and submitted an agreed jury charge, which queried whether Snively’s work resulted in Chesapeake sending the November 2013 check The jury answered in the affirmative, and in a separate damages charge awarded Snively $563,564.79 in compensatory damages, $380,287.20 in prejudgment interest, and $325,000 in attorney’s fees, and 7.5% per year in postjudgment interest. Panchasarp appealed.
In an opinion by Justice Miskel, the court of appeals affirmed. Panchasarp first argued that the judgment should be reformed to specify that Snively take nothing against Panchasarp as trustee of the Panchasarp trust. Second, he asserted that the evidence was legally insufficient to support the jury’s liability finding as to Panchasarp in his individual capacity. Lastly, he contended that the trial court erred in awarding prejudgment interest. Taking the sufficiency of the evidence issue first, the court looked first to the jury charge, which defined “Richard J. Panchasarp” to mean “Defendant Richard Panchasarp” and gave the jury a broad-form liability question on Snively’s claim that Panchasarp breached the agreement. It determined that a reasonable jury could have interpreted the charge to merely describe the causal relationship between Snively’s work and Chesapeake sending the check, as opposed to describing “the specific payee to which Chesapeake made the check payable.” Additionally, in final arguments both parties indicated that the issue had nothing to do with the trust, only whether Snively’s work caused Chesapeake to make the payment. Thus, there was legally sufficient evidence that Snively’s review and letter to Chesapeake produced the payment.
Even so, the court observed, evidence adduced at trial as to the existence of the trust conflicted, so a reasonable jury could have found that no trust existed in the first place. Even Panchasarp admitted that no formal documentary trust called “the Richard J. Panchasarp Trust” existed. By Panchasarp’s own admission, therefore, there was some evidence that a trust had never been formed, and that Panchasarp’s inclusion of the “TR” notation on the check didn’t refer to a formal entity.
As for the award of prejudgment interest, Panchasarp argued unsuccessfully that Snively waived her claim for prejudgment interest by (1) withdrawing her calculation of interest as a damage within her disclosures and (2) filing a proposed judgment without prejudgment interest. The court rejected both arguments. First, Snively specifically pleaded for prejudgment interest in both her original and amended petition. Panchasarp pointed to Snively’s subsequent supplemental disclosures and submission of a proposed final judgment as evidence of waiver, the court was persuaded that Snively’s withdrawal of her claim for interest referred to contractual interest on unpaid invoices, not prejudgment interest. Nor did she waive her equitable interest in prejudgment interest by submitting a proposed judgment without it. Panchasarp further argued that Snively intentionally relinquished her prejudgment interest claim in a transmittal letter and impliedly waived her claim through litigation conduct. The court found no case authority for waiver of prejudgment interest by litigation conduct, and the record was silent on why Snively removed prejudgment interest from a proposed 2016 judgment. In any event, the court of appeals reversed that judgment (which didn’t include prejudgment interest), putting the parties in the same position they occupied before rendition of the judgment. Panchasarp produced “no clear argument or authorities why removal of prejudgment interest from a proposed judgment on a summary judgment that has been reversed and nullified precludes, over six years later, following a new trial and jury verdict, either Snively from seeking equitable prejudgment interest or a trial court awarding equitable prejudgment interest.”
Finally, the Court repudiated Panchasarp’s contention that the judgment was not sufficiently definite judgment under Rule 306, TRCP, because it assessed judgment against Panchasarp the individual and not the trustee. Observing once more that the Richard J. Panchasarp Trust did not exist, the court held that Rule 306 was because the case had always been styled as one against Panchasarp individually and as trustee, and the judgement was otherwise complete, final, and appealable by its own terms. As Snively argued, the judgment’s Mother Hubbard clause (“Any relief not granted herein is expressly denied”) made clear that no other defendant was found liable to Snively. On the basis that the judgment clearly identified the parties and contained no internal conflict, the court affirmed the trial court’s judgment.
TCJL Intern Satchel Williams researched and prepared the first draft of this article.
