In a straightforward application of the Texas Citizens Participation Act (TCPA), the Dallas Court of Appeals has reversed and remanded the trial court’s denial of a physician practice’s TCPA motion to dismiss after a former patient filed an unsuccessful complaint with the Texas Medical Board.
High Risk Pregnancy Doctors, PLLC and Violetta Lozovyy, Appellants v. Feruza Akhmedjanova, Appellee (No. 05-24-00413-CV; January 15, 2025) began after Akhmedjanova allegedly failed to pay High Risk Pregnancy Doctors (“High Risk”) for medical services she received between 2021 and 2022. Upon being notified of the past-due bills, she filed a complaint against High Risk which, though dismissed by the Texas Medical Board (TMB), generated significant legal expenses for the Appellants. Appellants subsequently sued Akhmedjanova, seeking compensation for the unpaid medical bills and attorney’s fees incurred defending against her TMB complaint. At the heart of this suit are the contents of a petition Appellants filed that day. While the petition stated merely that High Risk and Dr. Lozovyy were “a specialist maternal fetal medicine practice and physician” who saw Akhmedjanova four times in 2021 and 2022, Akhmedjanova felt the petition disclosed confidential health details, such as her fertility issues and high-risk pregnancy, in a retaliatory attempt to “humiliat[e], [embarrass], and harm” her for disputing her medical bill and questioning their insurance billing practices.
Akhmedjanova countersued on this basis, alleging that High Risk and Dr. Lozovyy (1) negligently invaded her privacy when issuing the petition, (2) used “unfair or unconscionable means of debt collection” under Texas Finance Code § 392.303 and “fraudulent, deceptive, or misleading representations in debt collection”. She further alleged DTPA violations. High Risk and Dr. Lozovyy moved to dismiss the claims under the TCPA for targeting their lawsuit to collect Akhmedjanova’s medical debt, but were denied by the trial court. High Risk and Dr. Lozovyy filed an interlocutory appeal.
In an opinion by Justice Lee, the court of appeals reversed and remanded. To dismiss a suit under the TCPA, movants must show that the “legal action” was “based on” or “in response to” their exercise of the right of free speech, the right of association, or the right to petition (§ 27.005(b), CPRC). If movants succeed, non-movants must “establish by clear and specific evidence a prima facie case for each essential element of its claim.” § 27.005(c). If this burden is satisfied, movants must prove an affirmative defense or other grounds on which the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, § 27.005(d). The Court found Akhmedjanova’s claims—that High Risk and Dr. Lozovyy’s “negligent inclusion” of “protected healthcare information” and the request for attorney’s fees in the petition (1) invaded her privacy, (2) violated the DCPA and DTPA, and (3) intentionally caused emotional distress—were all based on the exercise of Appellants’ right to petition.
Thus, the burden shifted to Akhedmajova’s prima facie case for each element of her claims. The court rejected her invasion of privacy claim, finding that simply publishing the existence of a past physician-patient relationship did not show how they intruded or ‘pried’ into her private affairs. The court also struck Akhmedjanova’s prima facie cases for DCPA and derivative DTPA violations as lacking “clear and specific evidence” to show how High Risk and Dr. Lozovyy committed “unfair or unconscionable means of debt collection” (Texas Finance Code § 392.303) and “fraudulent, deceptive, or misleading representations in debt collection” under § 392.304. Finally, the elements essential to Akhmedjanova’s emotional distress claim were: (1) the defendant acted intentionally or recklessly; (2) its conduct was extreme and outrageous; (3) its actions caused the plaintiff emotional distress; and (4) the emotional distress was severe (Hersh, 526 S.W.3d at 468). The court rejected this prima facie case as well, concluding that simply suing Akhmedjanova to recover an alleged debt and consequently identifying her as a patient was not “extreme and outrageous” or “go[ing] beyond all possible bounds of decency, and [being] regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community”. Accordingly, the court reversed the denial, remanded the case, and directed the trial court to award High Risk and Dr. Lozovyy’s costs and reasonable attorney’s fees and to consider sanctions against Akhmedjanova.
TCJL Research Intern Shaan Rao Singh researched and drafted this article.