Plaintiffs filed suit against American Airlines and its employee in Dallas County, alleging discrimination, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and breach of contract arising from American’s alleged refusal to allow the family to board a flight because of a child’s disability. American answered and filed a motion to transfer venue to Tarrant County on the basis that all gates and terminals at DFW Airport are located in Tarrant County, where the alleged incident occurred. The trial court denied the motion. American sought interlocutory relief.
These are the facts of American Airlines, Inc. and Daniel Delgado v. Adam Halkuff and Heather Halkuff, Individually, and as Next Friends of M.H., A.H., C.H. and O.H., Minor Children, and Joseph Halkuff (No. 05-23-00621-CV; filed October 18, 2023). In an opinion by Justice Pedersen III, the court’s analysis commenced with a discussion of the plaintiff’s burden when an adverse party specifically denies plaintiff’s properly pleaded venue facts. According to the court, “[a] plaintiff satisfies this burden ‘when the venue facts are properly pleaded and an affidavit, and any duly proved attachments to the affidavit, are filed fully and specifically setting forth the facts supporting such pleading” (citing TRCP 87.3(a)). The trial court then must make a ruling based on the pleadings, stipulations by the parties, and the affidavits and attachments filed by the parties. A defendant seeking to transfer venue to a county where it asserts the cause of action accrued must produce the same level of proof by the same procedure. If the plaintiff fails to meet its burden and defendant proves that the county in which the action is pending is not a proper venue but the one to which it seeks to transfer is, the court must grant the motion to transfer.
Applying these basis principles to the record, the court observed that no mandatory venue rule applied to the case and that plaintiff sought to establish venue under § 15.002(a)(1), CPRC, by filing “in the county in which all or a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred.” American countered by showing that the terminal where the alleged incident occurred was located in Tarrant County and that is employee resided in Tarrant County, disproving plaintiffs’ venue fact and proving proper venue in Tarrant County. Plaintiffs, however, responded with no evidence, as required by the rules. Rather, they argued, relying on a Houston [1st] Court of Appeals opinion in a criminal case, stating that “DFW airport is located in Dallas and Tarrant counties. The court of appeals rejected this argument because art. 13.04, Code of Criminal Procedure, governed venue in that case, not Chapter 15, CPRC.
Plaintiffs also argued that § 15.065, CPRC, applied to their claim. This statute provides that in the event a river, watercourse, highway road, or street forms the boundary between two counties, “the courts of each county have concurrent jurisdiction over the parts of the watercourse or roadway that form the boundary of the county in the same manner as if the watercourse or roadway were in that county.” The court interpreted the statute to apply to “cases in which events giving rise to the claim take place on the actual boundary between two counties,” such as an automobile or boating accident. There was no such evidence in this case. The court thus concluded that plaintiffs failed to independently establish venue in Dallas County and that American established proper venue in Tarrant County. It reversed and remanded for transfer to Tarrant County.
What’s interesting about this case is that the court of appeals had to fix an error that seemed so obvious. How a trial court presented with slam dunk evidence of proper venue could simply ignore it indicates to us the dire need for of the legislation strengthening judicial education enacted this session. Some critics of that law argued that it’s not necessary because “Texas has the best judicial education in the nation.” Well, anyone reading our reports for the past several years may readily see just how erroneous and ungrounded that opinion has proven to be. We didn’t buy it, and neither did the Legislature. A proper judicial education system would presumably teach trial courts to follow the law. Unfortunately, there are far too many cases like this one where they didn’t.
