In a case transferred from the San Antonio to the Dallas Court of Appeals for docket equalization purposes, the court reversed a trial court denial of the City of San Antonio’s motion for summary judgment on the basis of sovereign immunity.
The City of San Antonio v. Drana Burch (No. 05-24-00078-CV; October 3, 2024) arose from injuries Burch sustained from a fall with her walker on a patch of uneven bricks outside the Alamodome, a city-owned facility. She sued the city for premises liability, asserting that the uneven bricks posed an unreasonable risk of harm, the City had actual knowledge of the dangerous condition and failed to make it safe, and that she was not aware of the danger. The City denied the allegations and claimed governmental immunity, asserting that Burch’s allegations did not fall within the Texas Tort Claims Act’s limited waiver of immunity because she had no evidence that the City had prior knowledge of the uneven bricks nor that the premises were unreasonably dangerous. The city pointed to the Alamodome Building Maintenance Manager’s testimony that prior to Burch’s fall, the City had received no complaints about the condition of the pavers at the location where Burch fell. It further had no knowledge of any other accidents or injuries occurring at that location. The City attached a photo of the bricks in support of its motion. Burch also offered the same photographs and a pair of purchase orders that showed that paver repair services were done somewhere at the Alamodome on January 3, 2019. The trial court denied the city’s motions for no-evidence and traditional summary judgment. The city sought interlocutory relief.
In an opinion by Justice Kennedy, the court of appeals reversed and dismissed Burch’s claim for lack of jurisdiction. As to the no-evidence motion, the court first considered whether the condition was unreasonably dangerous under the following factors: whether the relevant condition was clearly marked; its size; whether it had previously caused injuries or generated complaints; whether it substantially differed from conditions in the same class of objects; and whether it was naturally occurring. The concluded that the premises defect was not unreasonably dangerous because Burch presented no evidence that raised a genuine issue of fact. The purchase orders that showed that paver repair services had occurred did not establish why the city had requested them or where they were located. Plaintiff’s photographs demonstrated only “minor, naturally occurring unevenness” in the pavers that were not unreasonably dangerous.
Even though sufficient to sustain the city’s no-evidence issue, the court went on to address whether the city lacked actual knowledge of the pavers’ unevenness based on “whether the premises owner ha[d] received reports of prior injuries or reports of the potential danger presented by the condition’ ” (citations omitted). In State v. Gonzalez, 82 S.W.3d 322 (Tex. 2002), SCOTX held that TxDOT’s knowledge of stop signs being vandalized does not equate to actual knowledge of the signs’ disappearance. The court relied further on City of San Antonio v. Rodriguez, 931 S.W.2d 535 (Tex. 1996) as the converse example, because the city’s employee knew of leaks in the roof and that it had been raining. He could thus have reasonably inferred that there would be water on the floor, which the Court equated to actual knowledge.
Burch urged the court to apply the constructive knowledge standard in special defect cases. The court declined to do so because this is a premises defect case. “As the Legislature created an actual, not constructive, knowledge standard for waiver of immunity,” the court held, “we conclude that Burch failed to raise a fact issue regarding the City’s knowledge of a dangerous condition.” Consequently, the court sustained the city’s issue and dismissed the case.
TCJL Research Intern Dilara Muslu researched and substantially drafted this article.
