In a decision on a permissive appeal, the El Paso Court of Appeals has reversed a trial court summary judgment order determining that res judicata does not apply to a dispute over ownership of Loving County mineral interests.
Ridgefield Permian Minerals, LLC and Jim Hall v. DOH Oil Company (No. 08-25-00081-CV; September 30, 2025) arose from a dispute over ownership of mineral interests once owned by Lula B. Eades. Loving County and Wink-Loving ISD foreclosed on the mineral and royalty interests of Eades in 2000. DOH alleged that it acquired Eades’s interests at a tax sale the following year. Ridgefield claims it succeeded some of Eades’ interests in 2020 through deeds from Eades’ successors. Hall, one of Eades’s successors, retained a portion of his interests as well. Ridgefield, Hall, and other Eades’ successors banded together in a suit against DOH seeking to quiet title and for declaratory judgment, recovery for payment for proceeds of sale, for an accounting, for unjust enrichment, and for money had and received. In response, DOH asserted res judicata as an affirmative defense and counterclaims for tortious interference with contract and real property, civil conspiracy, filing fraudulent documents against real property, and to quiet title.
DOH’s res judicata defense stemmed from a 2010 Midland County lawsuit in which DOH and successors to interests originally owned by R.E. Abbott agreed to a judgment that DOH acquired Abbott’s and his heirs and assigns’ right, title, and interest pursuant to a Sheriff’s Tax Deed. Ridgefield later bought some of the Abbott interests. DOH argued that the present suit and the 2010 lawsuit arose from the “same nucleus” of operative facts. Because the 2010 judgment declared that DOH had valid title to the Abbot interests, Ridgefield was barred from challenging DOH’s right to any other interest that was foreclosed upon in 2000. Based on this defense, DOH moved for traditional summary judgment. Ridgefield responded, pointing out that res judicata should not apply because the mineral interests in question were not acquired from Abbott, and that Ridgefield had not acquired any interests in 2010 and therefore could not have raised claims in that suit. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of DOH and dismissed all of Plaintiffs’ claims. But since summary judgment did not resolve DOH’s counterclaims, the judgment was not a final appealable judgment. Ridgefield and Hall thus sought and the trial court granted permission to file an interlocutory appeal. The court of appeals accepted Ridgefield’s petition for permissive appeal.
In an opinion by Chief Justice Mendoza, the court of appeals reversed and remanded. Ridgefield and Hall raised two issues: 1) res judicata did not bar their claims, and alternatively, 2) res judicata did not deprive Ridgefield of a bona fide purchaser defense. DOH argued that the court of appeals had no jurisdiction because the trial court did not make a substantive ruling on a controlling question of law. It also contended that permissive appeal wouldn’t advance the termination of the litigation. The court noted however, that the trial court’s summary judgment ruling on DOH’s res judicata defense involved a controlling question of law and that resolution of that issue, “may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation,” as specified by § 51.014(d), CPRC. DOH’s motion to dismiss the appeal was denied.
Turning to the substantive issue, the court observed that “[a] claim is barred by res judicata if there is proof of three elements: (1) a prior final judgment on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) identify of parties or those in privity with them; and (3) a second action based on the same claims as were raised or could have been raised in the first action” (citation omitted). Concentrating on the third element, the court looked to whether “both claims arise from the same subject matter” (citing Barr v. Resolution Tr. Corp. ex rel. Sunbelt Fed. Sav., 837 S.W.2d 627, 631 (Tex. 1992). DOH argued that the subject matter in both cases was the same “because both concern[ed] interests that were foreclosed in the 2000 Loving County tax suit and whether DOH acquired valid title to those interests.” The court rejected this argument. “According to DOH,” the court reasoned, “if one of Ridgefield’s predecessors challenged the foreclosure, then Ridgefield cannot challenge the foreclosure of any other of its predecessors.” Even so, the two suits concerned different and unique real property interests and did not involve the same subject matter. Res judicata did not apply. The court thus remanded for further proceedings.
TCJL Intern Satchel Williams researched and prepared the first draft of this article.
