The Houston [14th] Court of Appeals has dismissed a plaintiff’s personal injury claims against a maritime transportation company for lack of personal jurisdiction.
Odyssea Phoenix, LLC v. Howard Wilcox-Carleton (No. 14-24-00622-CV; November 4, 2025) arose when Howard Wilcox filed suit against Odyssea Phoenix, LLC for alleged injuries he sustained while aboard an offshore vessel in the Gulf of Mexico. Odyssea Marine Holdings Inc., a Delaware-based corporation with its principal place of business in Louisiana, is the parent company of Odyssea Marine, Odyssea Vessels, LLC, and Odyssea Phoenix. Each of those companies is also Delaware-based, with its principal place of business in Louisiana. Only Odyssea Marine Holdings and Odyssea Vessels are registered to conduct business in Texas. All told, Odyssea Marine Holdings and its subsidiaries own a total of 14 vessels. Prior to the present lawsuit, Odyssea Marine entered into a contract with Anadarko Petroleum Corporation, known as the “Master Time Charter Agreement.” This contract allowed Anadarko to charter vessels from Odyssea Marine “from time to time.” Additionally, should any litigation arise, the contract stipulated that the two companies would handle it in Harris County, Texas. Pursuant to the contract, Anadarko chartered one of the vessels, M/V Odyssea Phoenix, to deliver supplies to Valaris DS-16, a drilling vessel owned and operated by a company called Ensco. Odyssea Phoenix owned M/V Odyssea Phoenix and Odyssea Marine operated and managed it. At the time of the charter agreement, Plaintiff, an Alabama resident employed by Odyssea Marine, was assigned to the M/V Odyssea Phoenix.
In June 2023, Plaintiff filed suit against three Odyssea companies: Odyssea Marine (his employer), Odyssea Vessels, and Odyssea Marine Holdings, as well as two Ensco companies. He alleged an Ensco crane operator aboard Valaris DS-16 struck him with “an equipment basket and pinned him under the load, resulting in a fractured hip and separated pelvis.” It was unclear whether Plaintiff was aboard the Valaris DS-16 or the M/V Odyssea Phoenix at the time he sustained his injuries, but, in any event, the record established that the incident occurred in the Gulf of Mexico, outside Texas’s coastal waters.
Plaintiff later amended his petition to add Odyssea Phoenix as a defendant. In his amended petition, Plaintiff referred to the four Odyssea companies as a single entity, Odyssea, or the “Odyssea Defendants.” Shortly thereafter, the original three defendants filed a special appearance, followed a few months later by Odyssea Phoenix. Plaintiff responded, contending that the Odyssea Defendants should be treated as a single entity for jurisdictional purposes because “any distinction between the Odyssea entities exist[s] only on paper.” The trial court denied Odyssea Phoenix’s special appearance. The company sought interlocutory relief.
On appeal Odyssea Phoenix alleged that the trial court erred in exercising jurisdiction because (1) Plaintiff failed to plead facts that would bring Phoenix within reach of the Texas long-arm statute, (2) Plaintiff failed to overcome the presumption that separate companies are distinct, and (3) Plaintiff failed to establish a connection between Odyssea Phoenix’s contacts with Texas and the operative facts of the case.
In an opinion by Justice Antú, the court of appeals reversed and dismissed Odyssea Phoenix from the case. Odyssea offered its CEO’s affidavit, which stated that the company had no offices, no employees, and no property in Texas. Plaintiff offered nothing in response, other than an alter ego theory attributing Osyssea Marine’s contacts to Odyssea Phoenix. Having determined that Odyssea Phoenix does not reside in Texas, the court turned to whether Odyssea Marine’s contacts can be imputed to Phoenix to support personal jurisdiction. Though Plaintiff argued that the Odyssea Defendants were part of the same corporate family and “work[ed] together as an interlocking whole,” he presented no evidence to overcome the presumption under Texas law that separate companies are distinct. For an alter ego theory to succeed, “a plaintiff must prove the parent controls the internal business operations and affairs of its subsidiary to a greater extent than that normally associated with common ownership and directorship” (citations omitted). While Plaintiff alleged that the Defendants had shared headquarters and common ownership, he did not show that Odyssea Marine exercised “an abnormal or atypical degree of control,” and thus failed to overcome the presumption.
Finding that there was not a substantial connection between Odyssea Phoenix’s contacts with Texas and the operative facts of the litigation, the court reversed the denial of Phoenix’s special appearance and rendered judgment dismissing it from the case for lack of personal jurisdiction.
TCJL Intern George E. Christian researched and prepared the first draft of this article.
