The Houston [1st] Court of Appeals has reversed a significant judgment against a manufacturer in a personal injury case against the manufacturer’s subsidiary.
Lippert Components, Inc. v. Quinton Williams (No. 01-22-00501-CV; May 1, 2025) arose from injuries allegedly suffered by Plaintiff (Williams) while working as a temporary worker at a facility owned and operated by a subsidiary of Defendant (Lippert). Plaintiff, an employee of a temporary staffing company (Diversified Sourcing Solutions) was injured when he reached out stop glass sheets from falling off of a cart. One of the sheets broke, severely injuring his arm. Plaintiff sued Lippert and its subsidiary, among other defendants, in Travis County. The subsidiary successfully moved to transfer venue to Ellis County, where the injury occurred. Plaintiff asserted negligence, premises liability, and product liability. The parties agreed to nonsuit the subsidiary, and Plaintiff abandoned his products liability and premises liability claims against Lippert during trial.
After a five-day trial, the jury found both parties negligent and apportioned 95% to Defendant and 5% to Plaintiff. It found total damages of $1,699,684.41, divided as follows: $87,600 for past physical pain and mental anguish; $613,200 for future physical pain and mental anguish; $87,600 for past physical impairment; $613,200 for future physical impairment; $198,084 in future medicals. Taking out Plaintiff’s 5%, the trial court entered judgment for $1,519,700, together with pre- and post-judgment interest and court costs. Defendant moved for a new trial, which the trial court denied. Defendant appealed to the Waco Court of Appeals. SCOTX transferred the case to the Houston [1st] Court of Appeals.
In an opinion by Justice Guiney, the court of appeals reversed and rendered. In its first issue, Defendant argued that the trial court erred in submitting both negligence and negligent undertaking claims to the jury because it didn’t owe or undertake a duty to ensure the safety of its subsidiary’s employees. Defendant further asserted legal and factual insufficiency. To establish a “negligent undertaking,” according to the court, “a plaintiff must show that (1) the defendant undertook to perform services that it knew or should have known were necessary for the plaintiff’s protection; (2) the defendant failed to exercise reasonable care in performing those services; and either (a) the plaintiff relief upon the defendant’s performance, or (b) the defendant’s performance increased the plaintiff’s risk of harm” (citations omitted).
Did Defendant owe Plaintiff a duty to maintain a safe workplace? The jury found that Defendant exercised “specific control over the specific aspect of safety” alleged to have caused the injury. Plaintiff presented evidence that Defendant stated a “general commitment to workplace safety,” but that alone “does not demonstrate actual control or the right to control the specific aspect of safety required to impose a duty” (citations omitted). Defendant also conducted periodic safety inspections, made nonbinding recommendations, and issued a safety manual to the subsidiary, although the sub made all the decisions. None of this evidence, however, established actual control. Moreover, “[a] negligent undertaking claim requires an affirmative action and cannot be predicated on a failure to act” (citations omitted). Thus Plaintiff’s argument that Defendant never confirmed that employees at the sub received the safety manual, never recommended that brakes be installed on the cart (from which the glass fell), and never ensured that Plaintiff received safety training was “unavailing.” The court, consequently, concluded that “there was no more than a scintilla of evidence that Defendant exercised control with the specific aspect of safety that led to [Plaintiff’s] injury necessary to impose a duty on Defendant,” and reversed and rendered judgment for Defendant.
