In a case with an odd procedural posture, the Houston [1st] Court of Appeals has affirmed a trial court order granting partial summary judgment to a pipeline company and denying the landowners’ motion for a temporary junction.
Right-Way Sand Co. a/k/a Right Way Sand, Inc., RPRS Investments, Ltd., and Adloy LLC v. South Texas Pipelines LLC(No. 01-23-00573-CV; April 30, 2024) arose from STX’s condemnation of landowners’ property in Chambers and Harris Counties for purposes of a polymer grade propylene (PGP) pipeline. The landowners challenged STX’s authority to condemn, filed a plea to the jurisdiction, and sought injunctive relief. STX moved for partial summary judgment on the issue of whether it had satisfied the statutory requirements for exercising the power of eminent domain. The trial court granted STX’s motion and denied the landowners’ plea and motion for temporary and permanent injunctions. Landowners filed an interlocutory appeal.
In an opinion by Justice Kelly, the court of appeals affirmed. The court quickly disposed of the question of STX’s authority by relying on Hlavinka v. HSC Pipeline P’ship, LLC, 650 S.W.3d 483 (Tex. 2022), which held that PGP met the definitions of “petroleum product” under § 115.001, Natural Resources Code, and “oil product” under § 2.105, Business Organizations Code. As the parties did not dispute on appeal whether the new pipeline would serve a public use (STX produced substantial summary judgment evidence on that point), the court easily concluded that STX had the power of eminent domain and that the trial court had subject-matter jurisdiction in the case.
So, shouldn’t the case have ended there? Well, no. Because the landowners sought a temporary injunction, they were entitled to an interlocutory appeal on the denial of their motion. Consequently, the court of appeals had to determine whether the trial court abused its discretion by denying the motion. Unfortunately for the landowners, they failed to follow Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 682 when they didn’t file a petition to the judge verified by affidavit. Second, counsel for the landowners declared to the court that it didn’t have any additional evidence to present at a hearing on the issue, so the court didn’t have one. Third, the purpose of a TI is to preserve the status quo. The problem was that the landowners waited 27 months to petition for it, in which time the pipeline had already been completed. In other words, what status quo were landowners trying to preserve by that time? Fourth, the landowners didn’t show what “irreparable harm” with which they were threatened. There was thus no question the trial court acted within its sound discretion in denying the TRO.
What strikes us as weird about this case is the landowners’ belated petition for injunctive relief after the pipeline had already been built. Obviously, the court of appeals couldn’t have reviewed the partial summary judgment in favor of STX until the trial court ruled on the amount of compensation STX owed to the landowners. Perhaps they sought injunctive relief, probably knowing it would be denied anyway, to give them an end-run interlocutory appeal so that they could throw their hail-mary on STX’s authority to condemn before determination of compensation. But that doesn’t make much sense, either, since Hlavinka had already slammed the door on their argument. Whatever the reason, the appeal of a foregone conclusion did little but cost STX, as well as the landowners, a lot of money. We should point out that every time something like this happens, it makes right-of-way acquisition more expensive. It’s hard to tell how long this litigation delayed the project, but it had to have some impact. In any event, it doesn’t look like anyone benefited from it here.
