In a case of first impression, the Dallas Court of Appeals heard a relator’s motion for rehearing following its dismissal of the relator’s petition for writ of mandamus for mootness. The issue involved the construction of § 15.0642, CPRC, which establishes the procedure for applying for a writ of mandamus to enforce a mandatory venue provision under Chapter 15.
In re Cedar Hill Hotel, LLC (No. 05-24-01478-CV; December 23, 2025) arose from a contract dispute. Cedar Hill entered into a ground lease with the City of Cedar Hill in 2019 for the purpose of building a convention center hotel. It borrowed about $14 million from Guaranty Bank & Trust, secured by a first lien covering the leasehold estate in the ground lease. In 2020 the bank notified Cedar Hill that it was in default, and the city subsequently terminated the ground lease. Cedar Hill sued the bank in Dallas County for breach of contract and common-law indemnity. The bank successfully moved to transfer venue to Titus County pursuant to a venue-selection clause that invoked § 15.020, CPRC, which provides mandatory venue for a “major transaction” of more than $14 million. Cedar Hill opposed the transfer, relying on a mandatory forum-selection clause in the ground lease that required suits to be brought in Dallas County. Relator filed a response arguing that the relator as plaintiff should be given the choice of venue, as both Titus County and Dallas County are mandatory venues for actions involving the project. The trial court granted the bank’s motion to transfer venue. The bank sought mandamus relief.
In an opinion by Justice Goldstein, the court of appeals denied relief. First, the court ruled that the original proceeding was moot because the trial court’s plenary power had expired before Cedar Hill petitioned for mandamus. Next, the Court addressed whether Cedar Hill’s timely motion for rehearing should be granted considering the conflicting arguments regarding the interpretation of § 15.0642, which establishes the timeline for applying for a writ of mandamus to enforce a mandatory venue provision of Chapter 15. In this case of first impression, the court relied on the rules of statutory construction. While Cedar Hill argued that § 15.0642 applied to a party seeking a challenge to an existing motion to transfer venue and that its petition was timely under the statute’s 90-day window prior to the commencement of trial, the court concluded that § 15.0642’s plain language precludes application of the statute to “a trial court ‘s order granting a venue-transfer motion and transferring an entire action to another county.” Here Cedar Hill sought mandamus to enforce a mandatory-venue provision (§ 15.020), not to challenge a previous trial court order which granted a venue transfer motion to another county. Further, a request for mandamus must be filed either before the “90th date before the date the trial starts” or “the 10th day after the date the party received notice of the trial setting.” § 15.0642. Here, Cedar Hill misinterpreted the word “starts,” assuming it could use the date the Dallas County court had set for trial before ruling on the venue-transfer motion. This trial date, however, was null once the entire action had been transferred to another county. Consequently, a trial will never “start” in the court that transfers the action to another county. The court surmised that the Legislature intended to disallow parties to delay the enforcement of mandatory venue provisions and set forth deadlines tied to trial, which functions harmoniously with Texas’ plenary-power jurisprudence. Accordingly, the Court concluded that § 15.0642 does not apply when a party attempts to compel a respondent judge to vacate an order granting a motion to transfer venue to a separate county via a writ of mandamus.
The court added that it would still deny rehearing in the event that § 15.0642 did apply. Cedar Hill failed to comply with TRAP 52, which requires material documents in a mandamus record to be sworn or certified copies. When Cedar Hill attempted to supplement the record with a purported copy of the trial notice, it ran afoul of the rule and compromised the integrity of the mandamus record.
TCJL Legal Intern Satchel Williams researched and prepared this article.
