The Texas Supreme Court affirmed a Houston [14th] Court of Appeals decision that reversed a trial court order denying a trampoline park’s motion to compel arbitration in a personal injury action.
As we originally reported last March, Abigail Dalila Cerna A/N/F of R.W. v. Pearland Urban Air, LLC (No. 24-0273; May 23, 2025) stemmed from an injury suffered by Plaintiff’s son while jumping on a trampoline at Defendant’s trampoline park. The accident occurred on Plaintiff’s second visit to the park. On the first visit, Plaintiff signed a release and indemnification agreement, which contained an arbitration clause. On the second visit, Plaintiff did not sign another release. Plaintiff sued Defendant, asserting negligence. Defendant moved to compel arbitration based on the release initially signed by Plaintiff. Plaintiff responded that since she did not execute a new release on the second visit, Defendant could not prove the existence of a valid arbitration agreement. She further argued that even if an agreement existed, it was unenforceable as to her minor child and the Texas Arbitration Act did not apply to personal injury claims. The trial court denied the motion to compel. Defendant filed an interlocutory appeal.
In an opinion by Justice Jewell, the court of appeals reversed and remanded. First, the court ruled that a valid arbitration agreement came into being when Plaintiff signed the release form at her first visit to the park. The release contained an arbitration provision explicitly applying to personal injury. Plaintiff acknowledged signing the release on behalf of her minor son but, as we have seen, raised a contract-formation defense at the trial court. The court of appeals rejected this defense, holding that in accordance with recent SCOTX precedent, an arbitration agreement may be binding on a non-signatory if the non-signatory benefited from the agreement in a way that equitably binds the non-signatory to the agreement (i.e., direct benefits estoppel). That was the case here because once Plaintiff signed the initial release, her son entered the park and participated in its activities.
In an opinion by Justice Bland, SCOTX affirmed. Plaintiff argued that although an arbitration agreement may have existed for the first visit to the park, she didn’t sign a release containing the arbitration provision the second time. Observing that parties to an arbitration agreement may agree to delegate to the arbitrator decisions about the arbitrability of their claims. This agreement to delegate can include the question of whether the parties’ arbitration agreement executed on the first visit extended to future visits. In this case, Plaintiff argued, the initial release contained no durational language. But, as Justice Bland pointed out, “[Plaintiff’s] challenge … is to the scope of the August Agreement, not its existence.” As the Court has previously held, parties may not reframe their “scope” argument as an “existence” argument. Here the parties agreed that an agreement existed, so that issue had been settled. If the Court were to entertain Plaintiff’s argument, it “would subsume scope questions into existence questions, eroding enforcement of the parties’ delegation provision.” In this case, the release “clearly and unmistakably” delegated arbitrability to the arbitrator. Whether the release covers the second visit to the park is for the arbitrator to decide.
