The Texas Supreme Court has granted mandamus vacating a trial court order to quash an insurer’s request for discovery in a UIM case.
In re Liberty County Mutual Insurance Company and Marianne Michele Cagle (No. 22-0321; granted November 17, 2023) arose from a 2017 car wreck between plaintiff and Liberty’s insured. Plaintiff claimed $17,632.60 in past medical expenses and more than $265,000 in future medical expenses and damages. The insured offered policy limits with Liberty’s approval. Plaintiff then sought the excess pursuant to the insured’s UIM coverage. When Liberty refused, plaintiff sued Liberty and the adjuster, alleging bad faith and seeking a declaration of her entitlement to UIM benefits (the Irwin strategy).
It turns out that plaintiff had five other car wrecks, one before the wreck in this case and four afterward, most of which involved the same head, neck, and spine injuries she claimed in this lawsuit. Liberty served two deposition by written question notices with subpoenas for medical records covering the fifteen-year period from 2007 to 2022, the date of the subpoena. Plaintiff moved to quash and sought Rule 13 sanctions against defense counsel. Liberty offered to narrow the scope of the subpoenas to five years before and after the accident, as well as to allow plaintiff’s counsel to redact any confidential information from the files before producing them. The trial court ignored the offer, granted plaintiff’s motion to quash, and awarded $2,000 in sanctions. The Dallas Court of Appeals denied Liberty’s petition for writ of mandamus. Liberty sought relief from SCOTX.
In a per curiam opinion without oral argument, SCOTX conditionally issued the writ. Liberty argued that the trial court abused its discretion by quashing the subpoenas altogether because plaintiff “has placed the existence, causation, and extent of her alleged injuries at issue by suing and, indeed, testifying that she suffered back and neck injuries—for which she seeks damages in this case—in other accidents that occurred with the time period covered by the DWQs.” The trial court’s order thus “vitiates or severely compromises [Liberty’s] ability to present a viable defense at trial.” SCOTX agreed, holding that plaintiff’s treating physician “is likely the only person who can provide evidence of [plaintiff’s] pre-accident condition” or of “the existence and extent of [plaintiff’s] injuries following the April 2017 accident, based on [plaintiff’s] complaints (or lack thereof) and any testing or observations by the doctor immediately after the accident.” Physician records could also show what plaintiff “reported about those other accidents, which could affect the factfinder’s decision about the causal link between her physical injuries and the April 2017 accident.”
Plaintiff argued that the discovery request was overbroad and not reasonably tailored. The Court observed that the requested records were limited to plaintiff’s medical treatment and further that the trial court failed to consider the proportionality factors as SCOTX directed in In re State Farm Lloyds, 520 S.W.3d 595, 615 (Tex. 2017). Additionally, the trial court clearly abused its discretion when it quashed the subpoenas in spite of Liberty’s offer to more narrowly tailor the request to a shorter time period. Finding that Liberty had no adequate remedy on appeal because it could not mount an effective defense without the requested information, SCOTX conditionally granted the petition, ordered the trial court to vacate its order to quash, and set aside the trial court’s award of sanctions.
Here is yet another error-correction case that should never have required SCOTX’s time and attention. And here is yet another opportunity to tout better and more accountable judicial education and training about the importance of following the law. We will continue having serious problems in some trial courts across the state if we do not provide and enforce far more rigorous education requirements across-the-board. The whole purpose of HB 2384 was to put some teeth into these requirements and to authorize OCA to collect more granular data about what trial courts are actually doing. We look forward to seeing that data and being able to identify where more support and training may be necessary. Otherwise, we will just keep seeing the same old, same old.