The Texas Supreme Court has granted review in a venue dispute involving a products liability claim against a dealer that sold a school bus to a school district.
Rush Truck Centers of Texas, L.P. and Blue Bird Body Company v. Sean Sayre and Tori Sayre, Individually and as Representative of the Estate of Emory Sayre, Deceased (No. 24-0040; granted January 31, 2025; No. 05-23-00775-CV; November 30, 2024) arose when a Blue Bird Body Company (“Blue Bird”) school bus hit and killed Plaintiffs’ daughter as she exited and crossed in front of it to get to her home in Parker County. Plaintiffs alleged the death was caused by the bus’s lack of safety features, specifically a crossing gate, and filed negligence and strict liability claims against its manufacturer, Blue Bird, and vendor, Rush Truck Centers of Texas, L.P. (“Rush”), who sold the bus to Brock I.S.D. out of its Dallas County office. Plaintiffs alleged that Rush “actually knew of a defect in the product” at the time of the sale and that the defective product caused the injury. Plaintiffs filed the suit in Dallas County on the basis that “a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the [said/aforementioned] claim occurred” there (citing § 15.002(a)(1), CPRC). Rush moved to transfer venue to Parker Count, which the trial court denied. Rush sought interlocutory relief from the Dallas Court of Appeals, disputing where it “supplied” the bus and its knowledge of the alleged defect.
In an opinion by Justice Garcia, the court of appeals affirmed. Rush argued the bus was “supplied” in Parker County because the Rush employee who initiated the sales proposal to Brock ISD worked from home in Parker County, where the bus was delivered. It added that all other activities occurring in their Dallas County location were clerical and only tangentially related to the sale. The court, however, noting that, as the Plaintiffs put it, “[b]ookends are meaningless without the books,” opined that “suppl[ying]” the bus included not just its negotiation and final delivery, but also all the actions that made it possible. Since the bus was ordered, delivered, inspected, decalled, billed, and paid for out of Rush’s RBC-Dallas ,the court concluded that a considerable number of events transpired in Dallas County.
Rush contended that these “administrative tasks” could only bear on contract disputes, not products liability suits, but the court maintained those tasks were relevant to the Plaintiffs’ tort claim and, therefore, its venue analysis depended not on the nature of the claim, but rather Plaintiffs could support venue in Dallas County. Because a substantial part of the activities relevant to “suppl[ying]” the bus occurred out of Rush’s Dallas County office, venue was proper in Dallas County under § 15.002(a)(1).
Turning to elements of Plaintiffs’ non-manufacturer liability claim, the court rejected Rush’s interpretation that they “supplied” the bus when the initial proposal was negotiated and the bus was delivered, without knowledge of a defect. Rush relied on Casas v. The Tire Corral, Inc., No. M-04-123, 2005 WL 6773889, at *6 (S.D. Tex. 2005) for the proposition that an item is “supplied . . . at the time of its original sale,” meaning that the employee’s mployee’s at-home negotiation of the “initial proposal” in Parker County established where the bus had been “supplied”.” The court pointed out, however, that this interpretation conflated the employee’s “initial point of contact” with Casas’ “initial point of sale.” The court further rejected Rush’s notion that “mak[ing] [the product] available for use” was the same as “supplying” it. The court disagreed, holding that the bus was not “supplied” in Parker County where the sale proposal was negotiated and product delivered delivered. The court also rejected Rush’s argument that the employee’s lack of knowledge of the defect could be imputed to Rish, since the petition named Rush as the non-manufacturing seller, who knew of the defect, not the employee. Because Rush did not deny the allegations of the missing crossing guard and their awareness of it, the court took those facts as true to establish venue in Dallas County.
SCOTX has scheduled oral argument on March 19.
TCJL Research Intern Shaan Rao Singh researched and substantially drafted this article.
