In a decision with potentially far-reaching effects on the power of the state and local governmental entities to acquire property by eminent domain, a divided Texas Supreme Court has ruled that Chapter 21, Property Code, waives sovereign immunity for a property owner’s repurchase claim.
The State of Texas and Kyle Madsen in his Official Capacity as Director of Right of Way v. JRJ Pusok Holdings, LLC (No. 24-0447; June 12, 2026) arose from an eminent domain proceeding initiated in 2013 by TxDOT to acquire right-of-way for a highway project. The state offered the owners of the property, located in Tomball, nearly $500,000. When the landowners didn’t respond to the state’s preliminary or final offers, the state petitioned for condemnation in a Harris County court at law. Shortly thereafter, the parties settled for about $681,000. The trial court granted the state’s motion for a nonsuit and dismissed the action.
A couple of years later, the state decided to reroute the project so that some of the property became surplus. The landowners sought to buy the surplus land, but TxDOT declined. They responded by assigning their rights to Plaintiff to pursue a repurchase claim. Plaintiff sued TxDOT and the state in another Harris County court at law, alleging violations of Chapter 21. The state filed a plea to the jurisdiction on the basis of sovereign immunity. The trial court granted the plea and dismissed the case. The Houston [14th] Court of Appeals reversed. It held that Chapter 21 waived the state’s sovereign immunity for repurchase claims, that TXDOT acquired the property by eminent domain (even though the parties settled the condemnation suit), and that the Harris County court at law had jurisdiction to decide the claim. The state sought review, which SCOTX granted.
In an opinion by Justice Bland, joined by Justices Lehrmann, Busby, Devine, Huddle, and Young, the Court affirmed. The state argued that although § 21.101, Property Code, entitles a landowner whose property is acquired by eminent domain to repurchase the property under prescribed circumstances, the statute does not expressly waive sovereign immunity. Plaintiff countered that § 21.003 grants a district court the authority to “determine all issues, including the authority to condemn property and the assessment of damages, in any suit … that involves a claim for property or for damages to property occupied by the party under the party’s eminent domain authority ….” This language, Plaintiff contended, grants a waiver of sovereign immunity for a landowner’s constitutional right to seek condemned property no longer necessary for public use.
The Court agreed with Plaintiff. It held that the Legislature intended to waive sovereign immunity for repurchase claims because it “nested the repurchase statute within existing law governing eminent domain—proceedings from which the State enjoys no immunity.” Just as the state “is not immune from claims on the ‘back end’ after it takes property without compensation,” it cannot claim immunity “from claims involving condemned property no longer intended to benefit the public.” And since the Legislature granted jurisdiction to district courts to “determine all issues,” those courts have jurisdiction to determine repurchase claims as well. Otherwise, the Court concluded, the right of repurchase wouldn’t be of much use in the first place.
The state tried to argue that it hadn’t acquired the property through eminent domain, so § 21.101 didn’t apply. It further argued that the statute didn’t apply where only a portion of the condemned property is no longer necessary for public use. The Court brushed aside these arguments, holding that when parties settle the value and dismiss a condemnation proceeding without a final judgment, the condemnor has nevertheless acquired the property through the exercise of eminent domain. The Court further found no statutory basis for applying the right of repurchase only to the entire property, reasoning that if the Legislature had meant to say that, it would have. Finally, the Court rejected the state’s argument that a repurchase claim is not an eminent domain case.
Justice Hawkins, joined by Chief Justice Blacklock and Justice Sullivan dissented. He argued that the longstanding principle that “the state cannot be sued in its own courts” should prevail unless the Legislature makes its consent crystal clear. He also disagreed with the majority’s contention that because the Court had found waiver in inverse-condemnation claims, the same result should obtain in this case. Justice Young filed a concurring opinion entirely agreeing with the majority opinion, but warning against loosening the “clear and unambiguous” waiver requirement of the Court’s precedent.
These opinions all merit close reading for their illuminating discussions of a whole panoply of issues that could well have implications beyond the construction of Chapter 21. It will be interesting to see whether the result in this case is a one-off or will have a bigger impact on condemnation decisions by governmental entities.
