The Texas Supreme Court has reversed a Beaumont Court of Appeals decision holding that a defective Chapter 74 medical authorization form filed with the required notice of claim did not trigger the 75-day tolling period for a health care liability claim.
In Dorothy Hampton v. Leonard Thome (No. 23-0435; March 8, 2024), the court of appeals reversed a trial court order denying defendant physician’s motion to dismiss on limitations grounds. The court held that plaintiff had failed to comply with § 74.052, CPRC, and thus did not toll limitations for an additional 75 days. At issue was the adequacy of the medical authorization, which did not authorize the defendant to access the health information and billing records of 11 of plaintiff’s 13 providers, some of whom had treated her injuries and others had treated her in the previous five years. Further, the release form used by plaintiff’s attorney was not the statutory form, which requires language stating that the release extends to providers who treated plaintiff after the date she signed the release. The court found that the medical authorization did not comply with the statutory requirements and dismissed plaintiff’s claim.
In an opinion by Justice Blacklock, SCOTX opted for a bright-line rule, rejecting the “satellite litigation” that the 75-day tolling period has engendered. Noting that the intermediate courts of appeals have taken various approaches to avoid the harsh result of the statute of limitations where plaintiffs have served a defective authorization form, the Court pointed to § 74.052(b)’s provision for a 60-day abatement “following receipt of a replacement authorization form that must comply with the form specified by this section” as the appropriate remedy for a defective form. The Court further stated that a trial court faced with a deliberate attempt to evade the statute may impose sanctions on the wayward plaintiff. In short, even an erroneous or incomplete medical authorization form is still an authorization form, as long as it “resembles” the form specified by the statute. The Court remanded to the court of appeals for consideration of the defendant’s other issues in the appeal.
Justice Boyd dissented. He would have upheld the court of appeals on the basis that the form plaintiff served simply did not comply with the statute because it omitted statutorily required information regarding providers who had in the past or would in the future treat the plaintiff. He also disagreed with the majority’s position that an abatement would take care of the problem because there is only something to abate if the plaintiff filed a compliant authorization form in the first place.
The Court left open what would happen if the medical authorization form is “grossly deficient,” which casts something of a shadow on the bright-line test it attempted to fashion. Still, it appears that if plaintiff makes at least a good faith effort or substantially complies with the statute, that should be enough to satisfy § 74.052 under this ruling.
