The Texas Supreme Court has reversed a Corpus Christi Court of Appeals decision overturning a Bexar County trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of HEB in a slip-and-fall case.
Marissa Peterson v. HEB Grocery Co., L.P. (No. 24-0310; April 10, 2026) arose from a slip-and-fall on the toy aisle of an HEB store in San Antonio. Plaintiff alleged that she slipped on water that had accumulated in the aisle, and that HEB knew or should have known of the “unreasonable risk of harm” posed by the wet floor but failed to make it safe. She sought actual damages, including past and future medical damages and lost wages. HEB answered and filed no evidence and traditional motions for summary judgment. The trial court granted the motions. Plaintiff appealed to the San Antonio Court of Appeals, which reversed and remanded. That court determined that there was more than a scintilla of evidence that HEB had actual or constructive knowledge of the allegedly dangerous condition. On remand, HEB filed a Daubert/Robinson motion to exclude the testimony of Plaintiff’s expert, which the trial court granted. HEB once again moved for summary judgment. The trial court again granted it. Plaintiff appealed. SCOTX transferred the appeal from San Antonio to Corpus Christi, which likewise reversed and remanded. SCOTX granted HEB’s petition for review.
In an opinion by Justice Bland, SCOTX reversed and reinstated the trial court’s order granting HEB’s MSJ. The issue before the Court was whether Plaintiff adduced sufficient evidence that HEB had constructive knowledge of the alleged condition of the floor (Plaintiff conceded that HEB did not have actual knowledge of the condition). HEB argued that the court of appeals erroneously relied on evidence of roof leaks elsewhere in the store to establish that HEB had constructive knowledge of leaking water in the aisle where Plaintiff slipped and fell, and that no evidence established the length of time the puddle was present before Plaintiff fell. In other words, Plaintiff had to show that “it is more likely than not that the condition existed long enough to give the premises owner a reasonable opportunity to discover it” (citation omitted). To do that, Plaintiff must adduce evidence of “the longevity of the dangerous condition, the owner’s—or its agent’s—proximity to the condition, and the conditions’s conspicuity” (citation omitted).
The Court first observed that “evidence of the earlier roof leaks outside the vicinity of the toy aisle does not raise a fact issue as to constructive knowledge of the puddle” (citation omitted). City of San Antonio v. Rodriguez, 931 S.W.2d 535 (Tex. 1996), the Court held that “[t]he leaky roof was not itself a dangerous condition; it could not cause a dangerous condition,” so the plaintiff must show that the roof leak is located in the vicinity of the puddle. In this case, the court of appeals failed to connect the “time and place element” that links the condition to “the time and place the injury occurred.” Plaintiff argued further that she raised a fact issue as to constructive knowledge even without evidence of the other leaks, but she failed to adduce “temporal evidence of the duration the danger existed.” Was it two hours or two minutes? Just because it had stopped raining two hours prior to the accident or the alleged size of the puzzle didn’t raise a fact issue as duration or whether HEB had enough time to discover it. And there was “[n]o evidence suggest[ing] that an HEB employee neared the puddle before the accident.”
Justice Bland observed that “[p]roving constructive knowledge of transient dangerous conditions like water puddles is difficult. Our Court repeatedly has rejected calls ‘for a relaxed burden of proof in slip-and-fall cases when the evidence is scant.’” Implicit in this statement is an awareness that such “relaxation” would undoubtedly result in a proliferation of dubious slip-and-fall lawsuits aimed at extorting settlements. We appreciate the Court (and HEB) for riding herd on this problem and keeping the wolves away from the door.
