Almost two years ago we reported on a Dallas Court of Appeals decision holding that a homeowners insurance policy with a special deductible for damage caused by a “windstorm” does not apply to damage caused by a tornado. Last April SCOTX granted review. In an opinion handed down last week, SCOTX reversed the court of appeal, holding that, yes, a tornado is a windstorm.
Privilege Underwriters Reciprocal Exchange v. Jeff Mankoff and Staci Mankoff (No. 24-0312; February 13, 2026). Stemmed from a 2019 tornado that damaged the Mankoffs’ home. They filed a claim for nearly $750,000 in damages. The insurer paid the claim less the windstorm deductible, which came to about $87,000. The Mankoffs filed suit against the insurer seeking a declaration that the deductible did not apply and for recovery of the deductible and attorney’s fees. The parties filed competing summary judgment motions. The trial court granted the insurer’s motion and denied the Mankoffs’. The Mankoffs appealed.
In an opinion by Justice Partida-Kipness, joined by Justice Reichek, the court reversed and rendered judgment in favor of the Mankoffs. It further remanded to the trial court for consideration of their attorney’s fees claim. The majority determined that the undefined policy term “windstorm” was ambiguous and equally amenable to the parties’ competing interpretations. Relying primarily on scientific classifications of “windstorm” and “tornado” published by the American Meteorological Society, as well as on a scattering of statutory references that separately list “windstorm” and “tornado” along with other weather conditions or risks, the majority concluded that the Mankoffs’ interpretation was “reasonable.” Consequently, on the principle that when policy language is ambiguous, it must be construed in favor of the insured if the insured’s interpretation is reasonable, the insured wins.
Justice Miskel dissented. First, she pointed out that nothing in the policy indicated that it intended to define “windstorm” in technical, meteorological terms. Instead, the policy must be interpreted according to the plain meaning of the term. For that purpose, she turned to a long string of dictionary definitions of “windstorm” and “tornado” that, although slightly variable, “consistently describe the key feature of a tornado as a violent wind.” Next, she examined the statutory references cited by the majority and concluded that, “[w]hile listing the two weather events separately may imply that they are not identical phenomena, it does not necessary weigh against an interpretation that a tornado is a subtype of a windstorm—just as not all rectangles are squares, but all squares are rectangles.”
In an opinion by Justice Lehrmann, SCOTX agreed with the dissent. The insurer argued that a tornado unambiguously qualifies as a windstorm for purposes of the application of the deductible in the policy. As Justice Miskel pointed out in her dissent, the policy itself didn’t indicate whether the term “windstorm” had a technical meaning. Consequently, the court looked to the plain, ordinary meaning. Dictionary definitions, the court noted, “are markedly consistent,” generally stating that “windstorm” means a storm with strong wind and little or no rain. The insureds contended that since tornadoes are frequently accompanied by heavy rain, they can’t be “windstorms.” But, as the court observed, dictionaries define “tornado” as “a violent and destructive movement of wind,” and more specifically as a type of windstorm. In any event, tornadoes always involve “violent, rotating wind.”
The fact that statutory references to windstorms and tornadoes exist, the court went on, does mean that tornadoes are not included in the broader category of windstorms, and “nothing in the cited provisions suggests that the lists confer an ordinary meaning that categorically excludes the narrower terms from the broader ones” (citations omitted). To the extent that any Texas authority has spoken to the issue, it concluded that a tornado is a species of windstorm as “more than an ordinary gust of wind, however prolonged … [that] may or may not have the whirling features of a cyclone or tornado.” Fireman’s Insurance Co. v. Weatherman, 193 S.W.2d 247 (Tex. App.—Eastland 1946, writ ref’d n.r.e.). As to the American Meteorological Society’s Glossary of Terms, which define a tornado as “its own distinct event, separate from any wind event,” it had nothing to do with the ordinary meaning of the term as used in the policy (although it would have been consistent with the ordinary meaning in any event). In short, “all tornadoes are windstorms, regardless of whether the broader weather event includes precipitation.” The trial court correctly granted summary judgment for the insurer, which the court reinstated.
