The Texarkana Court of Appeals has affirmed a Lamar County district court’s denial of a defendant’s motion to transfer venue in a trucking accident case involving several fatalities.
Western Dairy, Transport, LLC; B&C Holdings Company, LLC; RK Hall, LLC; Arys Hotshot Service, LLC; WD Logistics LLC; Southwest Leasing, LLC; and Vicente Barcenas v. Lauren Nevil, Individually and Brittnay Cox, Individually and as Representatives of the Estates of Bradley Allen Nevil and Sheri Nevil (Decedents); Reba Wright; Milan Von Kelsing, Individually and as Representative of the Estate of Patrick Scrivener (Decedent); and Margie and Rod Scrivener (No. 06-24-00071-CV; February 10, 2025) arose from an accident involving two passenger vehicles and a pair of tractor trailers that occurred in Childress County on June 1, 2023. The drivers and one of the passengers in the passenger vehicles were killed in the accident. The decedents’ estates and the surviving passenger sued multiple parties, including RK Hall, a producer and transporter of asphalt, ready-mix, and aggregates with a location in Paris, Texas. Plaintiffs chose to file suit in Lamar County, where they alleged RK Hall had its principal place of business in the state. Defendants moved to transfer venue to Childress County, where the accident occurred. After limited discovery and a hearing, the trial court denied the motion. Defendants filed an interlocutory appeal.
In an opinion by Justice Stevens, the court affirmed. The question was whether Plaintiffs made the required prima facie showing that RK Hall’s principal place of business was located in Lamar County. Section 15.001(a)(3), CPRC, gives a plaintiff the choice of venue and provides that suit may be brought in the county of the defendant’s “principal office,” defined as the office “in which the decision makers for the organization within this state conduct the daily affairs of the organization” (the presence of an agency or representative does not establish a principal office). The question boils down to whether the “decision makers” in that office have “substantially equal responsibility and authority” relative to other company officials within the state.” Plaintiffs’ evidence included the testimony of RK Hall’s vice president, who explained that the company president was the primary decision maker, followed by the vice presidents, CFO, and other managers, all of whom were located in Lamar County. Plaintiffs also produced screenshots from RK Hall’s website, which identified its location as Paris, Texas.
Defendants countered that RK Hall is a wholly owned subsidiary of Summit Materials, a Denver-based company with a regional representative who resides in Richmond, Texas. In his deposition, RK Hall’s vice president testified that this representative had “power and control over the locations” in the south region, including RK Hall.” He averred that RK Hall’s employees reported “overall performance, safety, financials, different projects, just … normal work issues” to him. Defendants argued that this testimony “destroyed” Plaintiffs’ prima facie evidence and established that RK Hall’s principal office was elsewhere than Lamar County (presumably in Fort Bend County, where Richmond is located).
The court didn’t buy Defendants’ argument. Observing that a parent companyt and its subsidiary are separate and independent entities under Texas law, even if the companies share the same directors and managers, the court saw nothing in the record that indicated that Summit’s representative was an officer of RK Hall, much less a “decision maker.” Specifically, Defendants failed to establish that anyone other than RK Hall’s officers and managers had “substantially equal responsibility and authority.” Even if the Summit representative had been an officer of RK Hall, which Hall argued but didn’t prove up, it wouldn’t make any difference because that evidence alone would not “destroy” Plaintiffs’ prima facie case. The court thus affirmed the trial court’s ruling.
